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ABSTRACT
The Peninsula Campaign of George McClellan has long 
been a subject of controversy, but most of the discussion 
has centered around the discrepancy between the General's 
grandiose plans for ending the war in one fell swoop and the 
actuality of his excruciatingly slow movement, his 
reluctance to attack, and his perennial and petulant demands 
for reinforcements so as to carry out his plans.. In 
particular, he was outraged that, at the outset of his 
campaign, an entire corps--the one intended to perform a 
flanking maneuver necessary for a rapid advance— was 
withheld from his operating army and retained for the 
defense of Washington.
McClellan insisted that he had made adequate provisions 
and left sufficient troops for the security of the capital; 
therefore, this decision could not have been made for 
military reasons and must have been prompted by a 
politically-motivated conspiracy to deny him and his Army 
the triumph of ending the war. His civilian superiors 
countered that he had engaged in creative bookkeeping when 
he outlined the forces left in Northern Virginia, and they 
were entirely justified in retaining I Corps.
This issue turns on the question of the two accountings 
of troops in and around Washington. But. it also requires 
inquiry into the peculiar nature of the politico-military 
structure of the Federal government at the beginning of the 
Civil War. This thesis examines these conditions in an 
attempt to determine whether or not the decision to withhold 
I Corps was based in military necessity.
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THE UNKINDEST COT:
THE DECISION TO WITHHOLD I CORPS 
FROM THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, 1862
INTRODUCTION
There is no stir or walking in the streets, 
And the complexion of the element 
In favour's like the work we have in hand, 
Most bloody, fiery, and most terrible.
Julius Caesar, Act I, Scene iii
If the story of George B. McClellan and his plans for a 
brilliant campaign on the Virginia peninsula in 1862 were to 
be staged, Shakespeare's Julius Caesar would be a likely 
vehicle. The setting and cast of characters for the two 
dramas are remarkably similar; and many of the same emotions 
are roiling about both stages (Roman/Elizabethan and 
Industrial Age American). The end of republican Rome and 
beginning of Republican America were eras of high passions, 
when politicians and generals strove to vanquish one another 
and shape the world to their ends.
McClellan himself, beginning with his accession to the 
command of the Division of the Potomac, and continuing to 
this day, has been accused of bestriding the narrow world 
like a Colossus. Those charges are certainly not without 
basis in fact: the Young Napoleon was arrogant and
overweening. He was adored— even venerated— by the Army he 
created. The Potomac could easily have become his Rubicon.
2
Like Caesar, at times he held himself above the civilians 
who crippled his plans and fettered his ambitions.
And there was no lack of petty men who scorned to peep 
about to find themselves dishonorable graves: other
ambitious generals, and, of course, Radical Republicans, who 
did not deem themselves underlings to such as McClellan. In 
Edwin M. Stanton one recognizes yon metaphorically lean and 
hungry Cassius (whom even the self-besotted Caesar knew 
should be watched). Benjamin F. Wade emulated envious 
Casca, and Irvin McDowell would make a serviceable Brutus. 
There is no Antony, but with Abraham Lincoln waiting in the 
wings as Octavian, the drama of the Peninsula Campaign yet 
reads much like the first three acts of the Bard's tragedy.
McClellan himself no doubt would have preferred to be 
cast as the warrior-king of Henry V , Prince Hal grown up 
into his heroic destiny. But that would have been before 
the Spring of 18 62, when he found his command undermined. 
Then he would have recognized the parallels between his role 
and that of Julius. The finale of the nineteenth century 
drama would differ from the Bard's: in the end, the latter-
day Republican ideologues triumphed, not only over their 
feared Caesar but over the incipient Augustus as well. But 
the General was nonetheless undone: as he took to the field
to crush the Confederate Army in Virginia and win the 
accolades of the nation, an entire corps on which he had 
counted was detached from his operating force on the grounds
4that the city of Washington must before all else be 
unassailable. McClellan felt that, like Caesar, he had been 
cut down brutally just when he was reaching for his greatest 
(and best-deserved) triumph.
There were other blows--at the same time McClellan was 
stripped of overall command and even lost control over his 
theatre of operations; recruiting was halted just as he took 
to the field; naval support on which he had counted was not 
forthcoming. But indubitably the unkindest cut of all to 
his mind was the withholding of I Corps, basely and 
treacherously removed by an erstwhile friend and supporter 
for purely political reasons. Stanton claimed that the 
troops were necessary for the security of Washington, which 
had been left defenseless by McClellan, a charge that 
outraged the General. He had assuredly made adequate 
provisions for the safety of the capital. Therefore the 
sabotaging of his plans for the campaign that would end the 
war had to be a foul conspiracy to destroy him for purely 
political reasons. The issue turns on whether the General 
in fact left Washington "entirely secure" before leaving for 
the Peninsula.
CHAPTER ONE 
DOGS OF WAR
Fierce fiery warriors fight upon the clouds 
In ranks and squadrons and right form of war 
Which drizzled blood upon the Capitol.
II,i
In many ways, the advent of the first Republican 
Administration was as tumultuous as the final days of 
Republican Rome. In less than a decade, the new political 
party had coalesced and wrested control of the national 
government from the previously dominant Democrats. In the 
election of 1860 it was abetted in this by the Democrats, 
who split their vote among three candidates representing 
southern, northern and union interests. That fall Abraham 
Lincoln was elected President on a platform that included 
opposition to the extension of slavery and protective 
tariffs for northern industry. Almost immediately, southern 
states began seceding from the Union.
Republicans were more or less opposed to slavery (on a 
variety of moral and economic grounds) and felt it necessary 
to root out the entrenched power of the slaveocracy in order
5
6to establish complete political control over the growing 
nation.^
Members of the Radical wing were combative, righteous 
and vindictive men with a passionate hatred for slavery and 
its political representatives. Even more revolutionary were 
the abolitionists, who often pushed the Radicals further 
than they might otherwise go. Radical leaders elected to 
the Senate were Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, Zachariah Chandler 
of Michigan and Charles Sumner of Massachusetts; Thaddeus 
Stevens of Pennsylvania led their forces in the House.2
The Radical agenda called for Slave Power to be 
obliterated, so these men were convinced that a short war to 
restore the union might end too quickly to destroy slavery 
and its attendant political power, impeding economic change. 
For this reason, they were suspicious of all Democrats and 
even non-Radical Republicans, who did not share their 
fervor. As the nation mobilized and controversy grew around 
war aims, Radicals also had visions of a Democratic 
politico-military conspiracy to prevent the complete 
subjugation of the South. Their worst nightmare was that a 
military dictatorship would grow in an Army commanded by 
West Point-trained Democratic-inclined generals. Therefore,
4. Harry Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals (Madison, 
Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), 4-5, 7.
2Ibid., 5-8.
7control of military patronage would become a crucial element 
in the Radical scheme.3
Moderates hoped for a gradual end to slavery and 
favored a compensated emancipation and the colonization for 
the freed blacks. They distrusted the fanaticism of their 
Radical counterparts, who were characterized by Lincoln's 
secretary John Hay as "Jacobins." As a Moderate, Lincoln 
held the restoration of the Union to be paramount— above 
party considerations and certainly above emancipation of the 
slaves, which he believed (at least initially) was 
incidental to war aims.^ But he was the head of a rather
precarious coalition government composed of war Democrats, 
old Whigs, miscellaneous southern Unionists and various 
wings of his own party; he had a job of work to keep them 
all functioning together. This diversity was reflected in 
his own cabinet, whose dominant members were Secretary of 
State William H. Seward, Secretary of War Simon Cameron, and 
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase.^ To a lesser
extent, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, Attorney
3Ibid., 10-26, passim.
4Ibid., 5, 10.
^Cameron resigned to become Ambassador to Russia in 
January, 1862, and was replaced by Edwin M. Stanton, who is 
discussed later.
8General Edward Bates, and Postmaster General Montgomery 
Blair also shaped policy.^
Seward, former Governor of and Senator from New York, 
had been Lincoln's chief competition at the Chicago 
convention in the summer of 1 8 6 0 . ^  He was not a Radical,
but Chase, his rival, was. The two men actively disliked 
one another, and it was a very delicate and diplomatic dance 
indeed that Lincoln performed to bring them both into his 
cabinet. Noted Welles of the function of the two rivals in 
the cabinet, "Seward comforts him [Lincoln]— Chase he deems 
a necessity."8 Chase's overriding motivation was 
"unappeasable ambition for official power and distinction," 
Welles wrote; his sole aim throughout his term in the 
cabinet was to build a power base of support for another bid 
for the presidency in 1864. ^ A Radical mole in the cabinet, 
he was influential in the appointment of many high-ranking
^Hannibal Hamlin as Vice-President and Caleb B. Smith 
as Secretary of the Interior are of little interest to this 
story except to note that they were chosen largely as 
concessions to the Republican interests in their respective 
states, Maine and Indiana.
^Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, vol 2, The War Years 
(New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1963), 42.
^Thomas G. and Marva R. Belden, So Fell the Angels 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1956), 73.
^Gideon Welles, Selected Essays by Gideon Welles, vol 
2, Lincoln's Administration, ed. Albert Mordell (New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 19 60), 36; Alexander McClure, Lincoln and 
Men of War-Times, ed. J. Stuart Torrey (Philadelphia:
Rolley and Reynolds, Inc., 1962), 129-30.
9officers, including Irvin McDowell as commander of the 
Division of the Potomac.^ Cameron, a Republican leader
from Pennsylvania and part of the Radical clique, was in the 
cabinet as the result of a political deal, pure and simple: 
it had been the release of his delegates at the 1860 
convention that had begun the stampede for Lincoln.^
Cameron's ineptitude eventually forced Lincoln to replace 
him with Edwin M. Stanton.
Bates, former Attorney General of Missouri, had also 
been a state senator and U.S. Congressman. Welles, a Jack­
sonian Democrat from Connecticut, had studied law, but had 
achieved his influence as a newspaper editor. Blair was the 
only West Point graduate in the cabinet. He had served as
counsel for Dred Scott before the Supreme Court and helped
1 ?find a lawyer to defend John Brown.
All these were men of strong opinions and ambitions; it 
was frequently a fractious group, and Lincoln was often hard 
put to balance their diverging interests. Further, neither 
the President nor his cabinet had any experience with the 
administering of a national government. And, in the midst
^Frederick J. Blue, Salmon P. Chase: A Life in
Politics (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State Press, 1987), 173-74.
After the advent of Stanton to the War Department, Chase was 
excluded from military decisions, which were thereupon made 
solely by Lincoln and Stanton. Ibid., 175.
■^Sandburg, War Years, 2:44-45.
^Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1946), 296.
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of a war crisis, they were "innocent of military abilities," 
in the words of the Navy Secretary.^
If the Lincoln Administration was unsettled, the 
condition of the army was hardly any better at the outset of 
the war. The American tradition opposing a military 
establishment had limited the regular army in 1860 to about 
16,000 professional soldiers stationed largely in the West.
It was further weakened by the resignation of many gifted 
leaders, who "went South" as their native states seceded, 
leaving about 13,000 troops. Many military commanders 
lacked practical knowledge of warfare, and "military 
differences and army jealousies existed from the beginning, 
which were aggravated and stimulated by partisan friends and
opponents of rival officers, and by dissent from the policy 
pursued in the conduct of military affairs to which many 
took exception."^
At the beginning, command structure was nebulous. The 
President was, of course, the Commander-in-Chief, but he 
traditionally did not make military decisions. He was to 
set policy and advise on the execution of policy. The War 
Secretary's role was amorphous, tending to grow or shrink in 
power depending on the individual holding it. Cameron 
hardly affected army commanders; Stanton would be a force to
^-^Welles, Lincoln's Administration, 69-70.
14Ibid. , 57.
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be reckoned with. The General-in-Chief formulated plans for 
the army; the President and cabinet approved them. The Navy 
Secretary (or Assistant Secretary) made naval plans. There 
was no requirement for cabinet officers to coordinate 
operations with each other or with the Commanding General. 
Beyond these, there were special appointed boards and 
committees to deal with military objectives. In effect, 
"Washington swarmed with amateur Napoleons."^
Morever, there was no central control within the army 
itself. There were seven bureau chiefs, who were not 
responsible to the General-in-Chief, but reported directly 
to the Secretary of War. Under Cameron, they operated more 
like satraps than as integrated elements in a military 
command. Later, under Stanton, they were to become more 
coordinated, but they never achieved real efficiency.^
By June of 1861, field armies had grown to 30,000 (and
would expand further as the war went on); no one in the
military had had any experience with forces that large.
There was no general staff, no staff schools and little
^Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War 
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978), xiii-xiv.
17Russell F. Weigley, Quartermaster General of the 
Union Army: A Biography of M.C. Meigs (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), 217. The chiefs were Adjutant 
General, Commissary General, Surgeon General, Paymaster 
General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, and 
Quartermaster General.
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military literature to help bridge the knowledge gap.1^
Officers who had served in the Mexican War twenty years 
earlier had been subalterns then. Only such relics as 
General-in-Chief Winfield Scott or Ethan Allen Hitchcock had 
held command roles in 1846; and now they were too old to 
take the field. British war correspondent William Howard 
Russell summarized, "It is a commentary full of instruction 
on the military system of the Americans that they have not a 
soldier who has ever handled a brigade in the field fit for 
service in the North."19
Politics was deeply embedded in the structure of the 
Union forces. The vast bulk of the massive armies that were 
to be raised were organized in units of volunteers. These 
men elected their officers; "charlatans, incompetents and 
demagogues were put into the most responsible places . . . 
untold harm was done both to the morals and efficiency of 
the army." Further up the chain of command there was no 
hierarchy of rank and authority. A major general could 
command anything from a division to an army; this situation
18Ibid., 165.
1923 July 1861, William Howard Russell, My Diary North 
and South, ed. Eugene H. Berwanger (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1988), 218.
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led to jealousy and insistence on seniority of appointment, 
which further disrupted the prosecution of the war.^
The Commander-in-Chief himself had no military 
expertise. In 1832, he had volunteered in the campaign 
against Black Hawk, serving a total of eighty days in the 
militia.21 This experience may have predisposed him toward
the idea of the citizen-soldier and the volunteer army. He 
also saw no difficulty in making command appointments for 
political reasons. It was a way to unite diverse groups in 
the war effort and minimize d i s s i d e n c e . 22 -gut some of these
commissions cost him--and the country— dearly. Early on he 
appointed to major generalcies Nathaniel P. Banks 
(Republican) and Benjamin F. Butler (Democrat) of 
Massachusetts, and John C. Fremont, the 1856 Republican 
presidential candidate. Brigadier Generals David Hunter, 
Edwin V. Sumner and John Pope were also "entitled" to 
commands by virtue of their political clout. These 
appointments were dreadful mistakes, which early in his 
administration may be attributed to Lincoln's fumbling to 
take control of all elements of government-including
20William S. Myers, A Study in Personality: General
George Brinton McClellan (New York: D. Appleton-Century
Co., 1934), 168-6$.
21Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, vol. 1, The Prairie 
Years (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1960), 61.
22t . Harry Williams, Lincoln and his Generals (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 10.
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patronage.
As for overall war aims and grand strategy, these were 
elements that never came together, at least for the first 
two years of the war. Commanding General Winfield Scott's 
Anaconda Plan called for securing the Mississippi River, 
isolating the Confederacy from outside commerce or 
assistance, then waiting for Unionists to come to power in 
the South. He saw no reason to invade. In fact, he 
imagined that such an action would alienate the southern 
Unionists of whom he expected so much, and he believed the 
North could win the war without an invasion.2^
Lincoln's original strategy differed only on one or two 
points: he intended to hold Fortress Monroe, blockade
Confederate ports, attack Charleston, and secure Washington, 
D.C.24 These last two aims are interesting inasmuch as the 
former was motivated more by retribution against the city 
that supposedly began the war than by military necessity, 
and the latter was the barb that snagged McClellan's 
Peninsula plans. Capturing Charleston had marginal military 
value,.but it would be a coup for northern morale. That 
Lincoln would consider this a basic requirement of Union
2^Scott to McClellan, 3 May 1861, U.S. War Department, 
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-19 01), Series 1, vol
51, pt. 1:369-70. Hereinafter referred to as OR. Unless 
otherwise noted, all references are to Series 1.
24Wil liams, Lincoln and his Generals, 16.
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strategy indicates he was aware of the psychological aspect 
of fighting a war and gave it high priority. That he also 
made Washington's security a strategic necessity shows that 
he was unsure of its safety to begin with and deemed its 
protection to be doubly important. Its loss, even the 
threat of its loss would be a humiliation for the new 
government and could lead to the recognition and support of 
the Confederacy by European powers. Not only must 
Washington be safe, it must be seen to be safe.
And, in the early days after Fort Sumter, the city's 
security was indeed doubtful. Maryland was a slave state 
and might well have seceded with Virginia, cutting off 
communications and surrounding Washington with enemy 
territory. Troops marching through Baltimore on their way 
to the capital were fired upon, and order was only restored 
through martial law. Rebels occupied the high ground across 
the Potomac River at Arlington Heights. Artillery 
technology had given them a range of three to four miles, 
and they were only two miles from Federal executive offices 
and government b u i l d i n g s . T h e r e  were rumors of a planned
attack on the city.^6
^Margaret Leech, Reveille in Washington (New York & 
London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1941), 99.
2^20 April 1861, John Hay, Lincoln and the Civil War in 
the Diaries and Letters of John Hay, ed. Tyler Dennett (New 
York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1939), 5.~~
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Regular forces in the District were nominal— "little 
more than the usual number of dottery old bureau chiefs, and 
a sprinkling of gold-laced officers from the Navy Y a r d ."27
Although Scott insisted he was not worried about the safety 
of the city, Times correspondent Russell noted that there 
were only seven or eight hundred regulars and two field 
batteries commanded by officers of dubious loyalty to 
protect it and the Navy Yard. The Yard's commander himself 
was "openly accused of treasonable sympathies."28 Russell
toured Fort Washington on the Potomac, finding it neglected.
Twenty determined men, armed with revolvers, could 
have taken the whole work. Afterwards, when I 
ventured to make a remark to General Scott as to 
the carelessness of the garrison, he said, "A few 
weeks ago it might have been taken by a bottle of 
whiskey. The whole garrison consisted of an old 
Irish pensioner."2^
But forces gathered and by late June, public pressure 
was mounting for some sort of advance against the Rebels.
On the 25th, Lincoln met with his cabinet and high-ranking 
military men, who advised against precipitous action. But 
Lincoln and his cabinet, as "political experts" overruled 
the generals: "public sentiment would not admit of such a
27B . Franklin Cooling, III, "Civil War Deterrent: 
Defenses of Washington," in Editors of Military Affairs, 
Military Analysis of the Civil War (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO
Press, 1977) , 43.
2^6 April 1861, Russell, Diary, 63.
292 April 1861, Ibid., 57-58.
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delay. 30 with newspapers running banner headlines urging 
"Onward to Richmond!" the army must move.
In July, it finally did. But it was stopped by Beau­
regard's forces at a small creek near Manassas Junction. In 
a bizarre encounter observed by picnicking Washingtonians, 
McDowell's green troops broke and ran. The routed Division 
of the Potomac scrambled frantically back to Washington 
(some soldiers hardly pausing there on their way home); 
McDowell was in disgrace. Radical Congressmen who had 
watched the battle returned to the capital convinced that 
the loss had been the result of military incompetence, and 
that they knew more than professional officers about 
successful campaigning.31 From this moment on, they
intended to supervise the military as well as ideological 
management of the war.
Lincoln's anxiety to fight had not been entirely a 
consequence of public pressure. He feared that a long war 
would reshape the Union and believed that a quick end would 
preserve the status quo ante bellum.^ Now he had a
^^Weigley, 169-70; Eugene C. Drozdowski, "Edwin M. 
Stanton, Lincoln's Secretary of War; Toward Victory" (Ph.D. 
diss., Duke University, 1964), 406.
^Hans L. Trefousse, The Radical Republicans, Lincoln's 
Vanguard for Racial Justice (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 
1969), 173-74.
■^Joseph L. Harsh, ""George Brinton McClellan and the 
Forgotten Alternative: An Introduction to the Conservative
Strategy in the Civil War: April-August, 1861" (Ph.D.
diss., Rice University, 1970), 95-98. Harsh concludes that 
it was Lincoln's eagerness to fight that resulted in Bull
18
disorganized rabble for the defense of the capital. He 
needed someone who could bring order to the Potomac and hope 
to the North. He called on George B. McClellan, whose 
victory in a minor skirmish in Western Virginia had been the 
only bright spot in a dark spring and summer.
Run, not the Radicals' pressure. Ibid., 103.
CHAPTER TWO 
BESTRIDING THE WORLD
But I am constant as the northern star. 
Of whose true-fix'd and resting quality 
There is no fellow in the firmament.
Ill, i
When the war broke out, McClellan had left his 
comfortable position as superintendent of the Ohio and 
Mississippi Railroad to volunteer his services for his 
native state of Pennsylvania. As a matter of fact, the 
governors of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York all wanted to 
commission the 34-year-old who had had a spotless army 
career after graduating first in his class at West Point.1
But William,Dennison of Ohio was first on the scene, and 
McClellan accepted a major generalcy of three-month 
volunteers.  ^ within a month, he was a Major General in the
Regular Army, commanding the Department of the Ohio; only 
Winfield Scott was his superior.
His success in minor actions made him seem the logical 
choice to command what was left of the Division of the
^Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan, The Young 
Napoleon (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988), 68-69.
2Clarence E. MacCartney, Lincoln and his Generals 
(Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 69-70.
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Potomac, but there were also political reasons for this 
military decision: needing a broad base of support, Lincoln
tried to appoint notable Democrats to visible positions, and 
McClellan was an important Democrat of state's rights 
beliefs.  ^ without consulting Scott, on 22 July, the day
after the Union rout at Manassas, the President ordered 
McClellan to report to Washington and take command of the 
army there.4 It was a prestigious post, especially for one
so young, and he set out to replicate his organizational and 
campaign success of the West.
The General had a plan. On 2 August he sent the 
President a memorandum outlining his strategy for defeating 
the South and restoring the Union. Beginning grandly, he 
informed the Commander-in-Chief that in order to "crush a 
population sufficiently numerous, intelligent and warlike to 
constitute a nation," the Federals would have to display an 
overwhelming strength. He therefore called for an operating 
army of 273,000 men, with a defense force for the capital of 
less than 40,000 men (10,000 to protect the B & O Railroad 
and Potomac River, 5,000 to garrison Baltimore, 3,000 at 
Fort Monroe, and 20,000 "at the utmost" for Washington).5
^Lewis B. Mayhew, "George B. McClellan Reevaluated" 
(Ph.D. diss., Michigan State College, 1952), 77.
4Ibid., 183.
^McClellan to Lincoln, 2 August 1861, Papers of George 
B. McClellan, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
This memo is listed in his Report as 4 August; but in 
McClellan's Own Story he corrects the date. George B.
21
McClellan’s strategy was based on several interlocking 
assumptions: the South would make every effort to remain
independent, and its military capacity was to be respected; 
hard fighting would be necessary. Therefore, there must be 
full-scale offensive operations and larger numbers both 
tactically and strategically than the Confederates'; thus 
the North must put a total effort into fielding large, well- 
equipped, trained armies. More than victories would be 
necessary--the South's entire military establishment must be 
crushed. Therefore, the ultimate victory was more important 
than the immediate one. And, finally, since the main 
guideline for northern operations was reasonable certitude 
of success, no hammer-and-anvil operations or premature 
advances would be contemplated.^
McClellan wanted the nation's military resources 
concentrated under his command in the Virginia theatre. 
Toward that end, on 2 0 August, the Army of the Potomac was 
created by his general order, over Scott's objections. It 
included the two departments originally part of his command 
(Northeastern Virginia, and Washington and its vicinity on
McClellan, Report on the Organization of the Army of the 
Potomac, to which Is Added an Account of the Campaign in 
Western Virginia (New York: Sheldon, 1864), 4 0-41; Idem,
McClellan's Own Story: The War for the Union, The Soldiers
who Fought It, The Civilians who Directed it, and his 
Relations to it and to them (New York: Charles L. Webster &
Co., 1887), 101-105.
%arsh, "Forgotten Alternative," 195-206.
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the Maryland side) as well as the troops in the Shenandoah 
Valley, all of Maryland and Delaware.^ While Scott felt the
Mississippi River Valley was crucial to the defeat of the 
South, McClellan thought Virginia the most important 
theatre. He agreed that Union strategy should include 
operations in the western river valleys, as well as coastal 
expeditions, but he believed that the decisive battles would 
be fought in Virginia, under his command. Following his 
victory there, he intended to lead his army to New Orleans, 
where he would mop up whatever was left of Rebel 
resistance.8 But the first step would be to shape up his
Army and build defenses for the capital.
In public testimony McClellan noted that when he 
arrived in Washington in July of 1861, "I found a very 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. The defenses of Washington
^McClellan, Report, 47-49; Idem, McClellan's Own Story, 
113-14.
**Ibid, 226-27. This statement refutes Reed's thesis 
that McClellan had a cohesive overall strategy. Reed, 33- 
44. What he actually posited was an ego-centric Eastern- 
based plan that focused all attention on himself and ignored 
simple military exigencies (such as the need simultaneously 
to open Union lines of communication along the South's 
rivers and to cut the Confederates' lines), much less 
political considerations. McClellan, far from having a 
strategic sense of the entire war, fully expected to bleed 
Western armies to plump up the Army of the Potomac, which, 
under his command, would then win the war. In fact, it was 
to be the campaigns in the West that wore down the 
Confederacy, even before Sherman cut it in two.
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were imperfect.”9 Privately he described the city as 
absolutely defenseless and wrote his wife not to come to 
Washington because it was not safe.10 To the Joint
Committee on the Conduct of the War (CCW) he explained, 
"During the fall . . .  my general object [was] to place 
Washington in a perfectly safe condition, and to organize an 
army that might operate on any line of operations, leaving 
Washington entirely secure."11
His first priority was fortifications. Washington's 
thirty-seven mile perimeter was to be protected by a system 
of forty-eight works mounting 300 guns: forts, lunettes,
redoubts, and batteries.1  ^ He assigned the task of
constructing these to Major John G. Barnard of the Corps of 
Engineers, who set about it with high energy. Disregarding
^McClellan before the Committee, 28 February 1862, 
United States Congress--Joint Committee on the Conduct of 
the War, The Army of the Potomac History of its Campaigns, 
the Peninsula, Maryland, Fredericksburg, 3 VoIs (New York: 
Tribune Assn., 1863), 1:2-3. Hereinafter referred to as 
JCCW.
10McClellan, Report, 50-51; McClellan to Ellen Mary 
McClellan, 18 August 1861, McClellan's Own Story, 88. In 
fact, the General thought it better to move the Federal 
capital to New York, but realized this was not politically 
feasible. "The defence of the capital, containing, as it 
did, the executive and legislature, the archives of the 
government, the public buildings, the honor and prestige of 
the nation, and, as time moved on, vast amounts of military 
supplies, was a matter of vital importance, and it was 
necessary to protect it not only from capture, but also 
against insult." Ibid., 93.
n JCCW, 2.
•^Leech, 139-140.
25
fields, orchards, houses, and churches, he built rifle 
trenches, earthworks and military roads. The main forts 
were placed half a mile apart, with twelve- to eighteen-foot 
thick parapets on the exposed fronts. There were also 
abatis of cut and intertwined trees. The exterior defense 
line was extended south of the Potomac to cover the vital 
port of Alexandria. North of the capital the forts were 
placed so as to command arteries of travel— the Rockville 
Turnpike, Baltimore Turnpike and Railroad, the Seventh 
Street road. The Major built big field works and auxiliary 
batteries on strategic points such as the ridge east of the 
Anacostia River (Eastern Branch) and above the "receiving 
reservoir" of the aqueduct, Washington's water supply.
With only twelve officers on his staff, by December 
Barnard had constructed twenty-three forts south of the 
Potomac, fourteen forts and three batteries between the 
Potomac and the Anacostia, and eleven forts beyond the 
Anacostia. The works on the right bank of the Potomac were 
larger, since they faced the more dangerous front. Most 
were enclosed earthworks, though several were lunettes with 
stockaded gorges. They were usually armed with twenty-four- 
to thirty-two-pounders on seacoast carriages. There was a 
limited number of 24-pound siege guns, Parrott rifles and 
lighter calibre field guns. Magazines with a capacity of 
one hundred pounds of ammunition were constructed in each 
fort. All in all, Barnard's system of forts was "larger,
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more numerous, more carefully built, and much more heavily 
armed than those justly celebrated lines of Wellington" at 
Torres Vedras, after which he modeled his works.1^
Meanwhile, McClellan began building his Army, Cavalry 
and artillery, he said, were "almost entirely neglected 
until I assumed command."^ He used the Regular Army 
infantry as the nucleus of reserves and tried for an 
artillery ratio of two and a half pieces per 1000 men, three 
per 1000 if possible.^ McClellan also reorganized his 
staff and authorized Allan Pinkerton, head of a successful 
private investigative firm, to establish a secret service to 
gather intelligence for the Army.-^
Alexander, "The Peninsular Campaign," Atlantic 
Monthly 13 (March 1864), 380. By the end of 1863 the 
Washington defensive network included sixty forts, ninety- 
three batteries and 837 guns, manned by 23,000 men. In the 
connected system of works, every eight hundred to one 
thousand yards there was an enclosed fort. Any important 
approach or low ground not covered by a fort had a battery 
to guard it. Everything was connected by rifle trenches 
large enough for four ranks of men. In the Spring of 1864, 
when General Ulysses S. Grant called many from the 
Washington defenses, they were replaced by semi-invalid 
veteran reserves. Thus, on 10 and 11 July, as Confederate 
Jubal Early approached along the left bank of the Potomac, 
there were only 9,000 troops to man the city's 
fortifications. Cooling, 53-55.
-^McClellan to Cameron, 8 September 1861, McClellan 
Papers.
Ibidem, Report, 55-56.
16A1 lan Pinkerton, The Spy of the Rebellion; Being a 
True History of the Spy System of the United States Army 
During the Late Rebellion. Revealing Many Secrets of the 
War Hitherto not Made Public (Hartford, Conn.: Chas. P.
Hatch, Publisher, 1886) , 245, 248.
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In a memo in late October to Cameron, McClellan 
reported at least 150,000 Confederates on the Potomac, 
"strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and 
strongly intrenched."^  He listed requirements for an
advance: for an active operations force, 150,000 men and 
400 guns; for the Washington garrison, 35,000 men and 40 
guns; to guard the Upper Potomac to Harpers Ferry, 5,000 men 
and 12 guns; for the Lower Potomac, 8,000 men and 24 guns; 
for the Baltimore-Annapolis garrison, 10,000 men and 12 
guns. That came to 208,000 men (or 240,000, to allow for 
sickness, non-duty, etc.) and 488 guns.1®
McClellan's plans for a grand Caesarean prosecution of 
the war were taking shape, but so far it was just that: 
plans. And there were others in the government with 
different ideas on how to win the war.
■^The troop return for the entire Department of 
Northern Virginia for November listed a total of 82,553 
troops, or 51,943 present for duty, spread out over the 
Potomac, Valley and Aquia Districts. OR 5:974.
18McClellan, Report, 46.
CHAPTER THREE 
VILE CONTAGION
We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar, 
And in the spirit of men there is no blood.
II, i
McClellan aside, probably few were pleased with the way 
the war was going, but the Radicals were beside themselves. 
The military stalemate was only part of it: the political
and politico-military situation was all wrong. In the 
aftermath of Bull Run, Congress passed the Crittenden 
Resolution, defining war aims in terms that set the 
Radicals' teeth on edge: it was to be fought simply to 
restore the Union status quo ante bellum, not to destroy 
slavery.^ The Jacobins were not strong enough to stop this
declaration; they would have to gather forces in order to 
marshal public opinion behind them. The Democratic New York 
Herald laid the Manassas failure on the Radicals' doorstep, 
blaming the too-hasty action on their desire "to divert this 
war from its legitimate objective . . . into an
^Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 3 2-3 3.
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exterminating crusade against Southern slavery."2 The
Radicals in turn attributed the defeat to a lack of fervor—  
military, if not Executive.
Then there was the problem of Fremont, who, in his way 
was to prove as sore a point to the Lincoln Administration 
as McClellan was in his. Pushed by the Radicals, in July 
Lincoln appointed Fremont to the command of the Western 
Department headquartered in Missouri. It was an important 
post, as Lincoln was trying desperately to hold onto the the 
border states, but from beginning to end, Fremont bungled 
it. Charges of corruption and malfeasance were rife. Yet 
Lincoln hesitated to fire the Radical favorite, to the 
disgust of his outspoken Attorney General.-^ Finally, 
Fremont's military incompetence and political maladminis­
tration outweighed the Radicals' support, and Lincoln 
removed him from command.^
223 July 1861, New York Herald, in Trefousse, Radical 
Republicans, 174-75.
-^Writing his brother-in-law, Governor of Missouri,
Bates railed, "General Fremont is not to be removed— at 
least until he has had a full opportunity to retrieve his 
fortunes, or to ruin our state utterly and endanger our 
cause." Bates to H.R. Gamble, 27 September 1861, in Allan 
Nevins, Fremont, Pathmarker of the West (New York, London:
D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1939), 530n.
^Sandburg, War Years, 2:120. Radical pressure was such 
that Lincoln was forced to replace Fremont with David 
Hunter, another political general who was at least as 
radical as Fremont. Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 177.
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Meanwhile, there was another thorn in the Radicals' 
side. On 21 October, near Leesburg, Virginia, Colonel 
Edward Baker was killed at the battle of Ball's Bluff.
Baker, former Senator from Oregon, Radical Republican and 
friend of the President, was largely responsible for his own 
death, for the political appointee was a military fool. But 
the Radicals seized upon the battle and Baker's death as a 
cause celebre, and, as with Bull Run, demanded inquiries to 
find and punish those responsible for the Union losses. The 
immediate scapegoat was General Charles Stone, Baker's 
commander at Ball's Bluff, but McClellan, who had issued 
orders for an advance, was also implicated.
At first the Radicals had welcomed McClellan, Democrat 
though he be, as someone who would take action, and they 
supported him in his efforts to unseat Scott as General-in- 
Chief. In October, he wrote his wife that he was conspiring 
with Wade, Trumbull and Chandler to depose Scott.5
^McClellan to Ellen McClellan, 26 October 1861, in 
George B. McClellan, The Civil War Papers of George B. 
McClellan, Selected Correspondence, 1860-1865, ed. Stephen 
W"I Sears, (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1989) , 112.
Herinafter referred to as Civil War Correspondence. At the 
same time, Scott was complaining to Cameron of McClellan's 
insubordination. "Has then a senior, no corrective power 
over a junior officer in case of such persistent neglect and 
disobedience?" he wondered. A court martial would be in 
order, he went on, except that a contest of authority would 
be detrimental to the prosecution of the war. Scott to 
Cameron, 4 [?] October 1861, Papers of Edwin M. Stanton, 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
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Yet pressure was building on McClellan to take the 
field with his growing Army. In October, "the Jacobin 
Club"--Trumbul1, Chandler and Wade--approached the General, 
urging him to go to battle. He resisted, blaming Scott for 
his reluctance.6 The next day the same three "came up to
worry the administration into a battle," noted the 
President's secretary. Lincoln defended McClellan and 
"deprecated" the new outbreak of impatience, but "at the 
same time said it was a reality and must be taken into 
account."^ Finally, the Radicals went to Seward and Cameron 
in the same cause.®
By this time the Radicals were thoroughly disenchanted 
with the administration. Wade sniped to Chandler, "You 
could not inspire Old Abe, Seward, Chase, or Bates with a 
galvanic battery"? while Chandler wrote a friend that 
Lincoln "means well but has no force of character. He is 
surrounded by Old Fogy [sic] Army officers more than half of 
whom are downright traitors and the other one half 
sympathize with the South.Moreover, both Wade and
6Hans L. Trefousse, Benjamin Franklin Wade, Radical 
Republican from Ohio (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc.,
1963) , 154 .
^26 October 1861, Hay, 31.
^Trefousse, Wade, 155.
^Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 179-180.
32
Chandler had lost faith in McClellan.10 Winfield Scott had
also reached his limit; on 1 November, he retired, succeeded 
by McClellan as General-in-Chief of Union forces.
But in December Congress convened, and the Radicals 
gathered strength for their drive against Lincoln and 
McClellan.11 On 4 December, the House rescinded the
Crittenden Resolution, thus repudiating the President's hope 
that the war be fought solely to preserve the Union. Then 
what one historian called the "spearhead of the Radical 
drive against the administration" was formed; the Joint 
Committee on the Conduct of the Wa r . 1^ All except Chandler
(a merchant) were lawyers; none had military training or 
experience. Wade, Chandler, Julian, and Covode were 
abolitionists and ardent supporters of Fremont.1  ^ Chandler 
and Wade's idea of strategy was continual attack; all were
b a r r e n  W. Hassler, Jr., General George B. McClellan 
Shield of the Union (Baton Rouge, La.; Louisiana State
University Press, 1957), 32.
11Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 181.
•^williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 64. Williams 
terms the committee "the unnatural child of lustful 
radicalism and a confused conservatism." Only two of the 
seven members were Democrats, Tennessee Senator Andrew 
Johnson and New York Representative Moses F. Odell. The 
other members were Chandler from the Senate and George W. 
Julian of Indiana, Dan Gooch of Massachusetts, and John 
Covode of Pennsylvania from the House of Representatives. 
Ibid, 65.
-^William R. Pierson, "The Committee on the Conduct of 
the Civil War," American Historical Review 23 (April 1918), 
558.
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scornful of the idea that military expertise was anything 
s p e c i a l . W e l l e s  viewed them all as "extreme and violent
. . . implacable and revengeful" and thought them as
irrational as the secessionists themselves.^
Charged with inquiring into the conduct of the war, the 
Committee was free to call any witness it chose. Its 
proceedings were secret, although they could be "leaked" as 
it suited the Radicals; in some respects it acted as an 
inquisition--ferreting out heretics in the military and 
exposing their iniquities to the world at large. Its 
members had no legislative function but reported their 
findings to the President or gave policy advice on the basis 
of the military and ideological sins they had uncovered.^
Objects of their inquiry, such as General Stone, could be 
brought before the CCW to defend military decisions without 
knowing the charges against them or the testimony already 
heard. The CCW's powers were actually limited; it could 
question officials, but not dismiss or appoint them? 
however, members did have influence.-^
14Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 72. 
l^Welles, Lincoln's Administration, 71.
^Pierson, 560.
^Hans L. Trefousse, "The Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War; A Reassessment;" Civil War History 10 
(1964) , 19 .
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The CCW was a weighty cross for Lincoln, although it 
did have its usefulness in his schema: he was willing to
move with the times, but was always conscious of the need 
for the support of conservatives, especially in the border 
states. Therefore he used Radical pressure, through the 
activities and pronouncements of the Committee, to push 
"slow" generals and politicians. For example, on 31
December, the CCW called on the President to demand action 
on both the military and abolition fronts. The next day, 
Lincoln spoke to McClellan, mentioning the Committee's visit 
in an attempt to encourage the General to move.^
On 23 December, the Committee called McClellan to 
testify. Ill (probably with typhoid), he did not appear.
But in rapid succession, many of his subordinates were 
called. J.P. Richardson, Samuel P. Heintzelman, William B. 
Franklin, Montgomery C. Meigs, James S. Wadsworth, and 
McDowell were only the first.Heintzelman noted that the 
roads in Northern Virginia were too "narrow and contracted" 
to maneuver a force the size of the Army of the Potomac;
l®Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 182. Trefousse 
elsewhere notes that the Committee's influence was actually 
limited: Lincoln took care of McClellen in his own good
time, not the CCW's. Likewise in the cases of Fremont and 
Butler: though the darlings of the Radicals and their
Committee, Lincoln had the final say in whether the former 
got a prize command or the latter stayed in New Orleans. 
Idem, "Joint Committee," 15-16.
19Ibid., 13.
20JCCW, 1:70-71.
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Franklin outlined the possibilities of an expedition to 
Urbana, on the Rappahannock River. He added that once the 
Confederate Army had crossed the Rappahannock and burnt its 
railroad bridge, a Federal attack across the river would be 
too costly, and too easily defended by the Rebels.21
Meanwhile, Lincoln proposed that the Army of the 
Potomac hold the Confederates at Centerville with 50,000 
men, while another 50,000 flanked Johnston across the 
Potomac at Occoquan Creek. 2^ McClellan leisurely rejected 
the suggestion, saying that he had "another plan of campaign 
that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy, nor by - 
many of our own people."^ But the General gave the
President no details and thus set the stage for future 
frustrations. Handicapped by his lack of military training, 
Lincoln depended on his military advisors and commanders to 
give him information needed to set strategic policy. The 
plan McClellan was entertaining was probably that vaguely 
outlined by Franklin before the CCW— a move on Richmond from 
the Lower Chesapeake, but he did not deign to explain it. 
When McClellan brusquely rejected Lincoln's proposal without
^Heintzelman before CCW, 24 December, 1861, JCCW, 
Report, 118? Franklin before CCW, 26 December, 1861, Ibid., 
125-27.
^ L i n c o l n  to McClellan, c. 1 December 1861, Abraham 
Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. 
Basler (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Unviersity Press,
1953-1955), 5:34.
^McClellan, Civil War Correspondence, 143.
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developing and presenting an alternative, he did his 
campaign and his country a great disservice.24 The
President felt that "the military machine, both East and 
West, was not only at a complete standstill, but was without
a programme."25
24Alexander S. Webb, The Peninsula, McClellan's 
Campaign of 1862, vol. 3, Campaigns of the Civil War (New 
York: Jack Brussel, Publisher, n.d.), 14-15.
25john G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A 
History (New York: Century Co., 1886-1890), 5:100.
CHAPTER FOUR 
INSTRUMENTS OF FEAR AND WARNING
But it is doubtful yet 
Whether Caesar will come forth to-day or no?
H r  i
On the sixth of January, the CCW met with the full 
Cabinet to discuss McClellan. They took no action but 
recommended that McDowell replace McClellan.1 A few days
later, Bates urged--not for the first time--that Lincoln 
simply take over military command; the President and Cameron 
protested that the generals would not like such a course of 
events.^ Lincoln sought further advice.
-'-Trefousse, Radical Republicans, 185.
210 January 1862, Edward Bates, The Diary of Edward 
Bates, 1859-1866, ed. Howard K. Beale, vol. 4 of Annual 
Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 
193 0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1933), 224. Bates had urged this for months: Lincoln,
"being 'Commander in Chief' by law, he must command. . . .
The Nation requires it, and History will hold him 
responsible." Bates also saw no reason for a General-in- 
Chief: not only was there no general with experience with
large armies, this one told no one anything of his plans, 
"so that the strange and dangerous fact exists, that the 
Sec. of War and the Prest. are ignorant of the condition of 
the army and its intended operations." 31 December, 1861, 
Ibid., 218-19.
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On the advice of Quartermaster General Meigs, the 
President called a war council of McDowell, Franklin, Chase, 
Seward, and an Assistant Secretary of W a r .3 Lincoln
described the pressures on him and recounted recent military 
failures in the West. What was to be done? McDowell 
recommended organizing the Army of the Potomac into corps 
d 1armee and moving from Washington along railroad lines, all 
of which led to the enemy's position. Franklin suggested an 
operation on the York River toward Richmond. But since 
neither general knew the condition of the Army of the 
Potomac, the meeting was adjourned until the next night, so 
they could look into it.
Blair,the only cabinet member with military expertise, 
joined that meeting. By now, McDowell and Franklin agreed 
that if the question was of an immediate advance (which was 
Lincoln's hope), the best movement now would not involve a 
change of base (i.e., to the York River). Blair stood up 
for Franklin's Peninsula project— he thought it had a better 
chance of significant victory. Seward just wanted any win, 
and Chase agreed that the moral power of any success would 
suit the administration's purposes.^
^Cameron was conspicuous by his absence. He had 
finally been mired in his own malfeasance and was in the 
process of being eased out of office and into the 
Ambassadorship to Russia.
^In November, Chase had consulted with McClellen, 
because he was finding it hard to sell government bonds—  
investors were disinclined to back an Administration that at 
best was not winning the war, and at worst might lose it.
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On the 12th, McClellan, having got wind of these 
councils, was up and around; Lincoln announced they would 
all meet with him the next day.-* An icy McClellan joined
the previous lot. He sat silently until Meigs pointed out 
to him that the Commander-in-Chief had the right to hear his 
plans for his armies. McClellan eventually muttered that 
Don Carlos Buell was set to advance soon in Kentucky, and 
this seemed to be enough for Lincoln. It was an ugly scene: 
McClellan believed McDowell was conniving against him; Chase 
blustered and blundered; Lincoln desperately sought some 
reassurance that the military situation was under control; 
and Meigs concluded that "McClellan would prefer to send 
forward any other troops than those under his present 
command."^
At about this same time, Cameron's activities had 
finally put him beyond the pale. The last straw was the War 
Department's annual reportwhich contained a strongly-
On the basis of McClellan's assurances that the Army of the 
Potomac would make a significant movement to Urbana, the 
Treasury^Secretary was able to sell bonds. J.W. Schuckers, 
The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase (New 
York: D. Appleton & Co., 1874), 445. Thus Chase apparently
knew of this plan although Lincoln did not.
^ill iam Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, 
A Critical History of Operations in Virginia, Maryland and 
Pennsylvania from the Commencement to the Close of the War, 
1861-1865 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882) , 79-84.
^Montgomery C. Meigs, "General M.C. Meigs on the 
Conduct of the Civil War," American Historical Review 26 
(January 1921), 293.
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worded emancipation statement, issued to the press without 
Lincoln s authorization.  ^ with a certain clumsiness,
Lincoln negotiated the Secretary of War's resignation and
appointed him Ambassador to Russia, effective the same day
as the final war council. His replacement was to play a
much bigger role in the running of the war, and in the
upcoming campaign, than Cameron ever would have done.
Edwin M. Stanton's appointment as Secretary of War was
something of a surprise. An anti-slavery Democrat, he had
served briefly in Buchanan's cabinet as Attorney General,
but upon Lincoln's taking office, Stanton returned to
private law practice and was a caustic critic of the new
administration. Yet he saw some benefits of the present
conflict, as he noted just before the firing on Fort Sumter.
I do not think peaceful relations will continue 
much longer. Nor indeed do I think hostilities 
will be so great an evil as many apprehend. A 
round or two often serves to restore harmony; and 
the vast consumption required by a state of
7It must be remembered that Lincoln's overriding 
concern was for the retention of the border states, and he 
felt that a program of emancipation would alienate those in 
these areas who would otherwise remain loyal. He also 
doubted his ability to enforce any such policy. He only 
succumbed to abolitionist/ Radical pressure to proclaim 
limited emancipation after McClellan repulsed Lee at 
Antietam late in 1862, whereupon there was trouble with many 
soldiers, who declared that they had gone to war to restore 
the Union, but would not fight for "niggers." Cameron's 
statement in December, 1861, was therefore presumptuous, 
premature and precipitate.
41
hostilities will enrich rather than impoverish the
North.8
Of all Lincoln's coterie, Stanton "presented the 
strangest medley of individual attributes," observed one 
contemporary. He respected the President's authority 
because it was greater than his own; but he did not have a 
high opinion of Lincoln's fitness for the position.9 The
Navy Secretary characterized Stanton as a zealous, devoted 
and hard worker, adept at intrigue and able to influence 
Congressional leaders; he was also "a hypocrite, [and] a 
moral coward."^  There were those who believed Stanton was 
not "the gruff, disagreeable personage he is so generally 
represented"; but Lincoln's own private secretary John Hay 
once begged his confrere John G. Nicolay not to send him to
8Stanton to John A. Dix, 8 April 1861, in Drozdowski, 
376. Stanton's rather Draconian viewpoint was further exem­
plified by his support of the suspension of habeas corpus 
and his attitude in the case of General Stone. Stanton 
remained unmoved by the general disgraced and ruined without 
benefit of Consitutionally-guaranteed due process of law.
"To hold one commander in prison untried," he opined, "is 
less harmful in times of great national distress than to 
withdraw several good officers from active battle-fields to 
give him a trial. Individuals are nothing; we are contribu­
ting thousands of them to save the Union, and General Stone 
in [confinement in] Fort Lafayette is doing his share in 
that direction." Frank A. Flower, Edwin McMaster Stanton 
The Autocrat of Rebellion, Emancipation and Reconstruction 
(Akron, Ohio: Saalfield Publishing Company, 1905), 137.
9McClure, 157-58.
-^Undated entry, Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, 
ed., Howard K. Beale (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc.,
1960), 1:68.
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Stanton to ask favors, for "I would rather make a tour of a 
smallpox hospital."11
Stanton had clear views on power in general and the
Executive Office's exercise of it in particular.
He recognized no limit upon executive power in the 
execution of the laws and the defense of the 
Constitution. Equally sure was he that there was 
no other restraint upon the President's powers as 
the supreme military commander than were to be 
found in the Articles of War and the Usages of 
Nations.^
As Secretary of War, Stanton felt he was Commander-in-Chief. 
He yielded only to Lincoln's a u t h o r i t y . H e  had nothing
but contempt for professional soldiers and enjoyed his power 
over t h e m .14 Attorney General Bates decided early on that,
as far as generals were concerned, Stanton would "assuredly 
speak to them in orders."^ And a foreign military observer
noted that Stanton was "instrumental, more than any one 
else, in developing in Mr. Lincoln's mind the idea of
-^Frederick Milnes Edge, Major-General McClellan and 
the Campaign on the Yorktown Peninsula (London: Trubner &
Co., 1865), 63; Allan Nevms, The War for the Union (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons~, i960) , 2:35 .
l^George C. Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin 
M. Stanton (Boston & New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.,
1899), 327.
13McClure, 162.
14Wi lliams, Lincoln and the Generals, 57.
1^ 2 February 1862, Bates, 228. This, of course, was 
only as it should be, to Bates's way of thinking. Lincoln 
was the Commander-in-Chief; Stanton the President's 
lieutenant. Bates never ceased urging Lincoln to command.
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directing military operations in person, from the depths of 
the White House."18
Throughout the fall and winter of 1861, Stanton 
cultivated McClellan. "Success was always Stanton's 
touchstone, and McClellan's star seemed to be rising 
irresistibly."17 As early as October, after Cameron made an 
abolition speech to a newly-arrived regiment, McClellan 
reported that Stanton urged him to arrest the War Secretary 
for inciting to insubordination and advocated the General 
seizing the government and becoming dictator.18 Soon
McClellan was writing to his wife that in order to get any 
work done he had to escape to Stanton's house "to dodge all 
enemies in shape of 'browsing' Presidents etc. . . ."l9 It
was Stanton who had advised McClellan of the President's war
18Philippe, Comte de Paris, "McClellan's Organizing the 
Grand Army," in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. 
Clarence C. Buel & Robert U. Johnson (New York, Century 
Press, 1887-1888) 2:120.
17Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The
Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York, 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 131. There is no definitive 
biography of Stanton, which is a loss to any study of the 
Civil War. This and the Gorham and Flowers works are all 
that is available in published form? they are individually 
and collectively lacking. Drozdowski's dissertation, more 
than 1000 pages long, was to have been only the first part 
of a complete study of Lincoln's War Secretary; but 
evidently the rather ambitious project was never completed.
18McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 152.
19McC1 ellan to Ellen McClellan, sometime in October or
November, 1861, McClellan Papers.
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conferences in January, warning him, "They are counting on 
your death, and are already dividing among themselves your 
military goods and chattels."20
Soon after taking office, however, Stanton became a 
"convert" to the Radical cause.^ He was not a hypocrite in
this respect, said one observer, but genuinely changed his 
beliefs after gaining power: he was "a sound and sincere
friend, political and personal, of the men who showered 
their favors on his head."22 Horace Greeley's New York
Tribune and William Cullen Bryant's New York Post, both 
Radical/abolitionist in slant, defended Stanton's 
appointment: he was, after all, approved by Wade, Fessenden
and Trumbull. Even the Democratic New York Herald on 14 
January gave Stanton credit for "a strong head, clean hands, 
and a pure heart,"22 Fessenden commented on his first 
meeting with the new War Secretary that "we agreed perfectly 
on all points. If he acts up to his promises, he will be 
just the man for Secty of War."2  ^ Stanton began immediately
to cultivate the Radicals of Congress and continued this
2^Idem, McClellan's Own Story, 155.
2-4ienry L. Dawes, "Recollections of Stanton under 
Lincoln," Atlantic Monthly 25 (February 1894), 167.
22Jeremiah S. Black, "Senator Wilson and Edwin M. 
Stanton," Galaxy 9 (June 1870), 823.
22Drozdowski, 559-60; 540.
2^Fessenden to Chase, 15 January 1862, Papers of Salmon 
P. Chase, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
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practice throughout the war and beyond. It seems clear that 
he befriended and encouraged McClellan while the latter was 
in the ascendancy and favor was to be accrued through 
association with him. Then, when Stanton had achieved power 
of his own, he could afford to turn on McClellan, 
particularly at a time when the General was coming under 
attack.
Almost immediately after Stanton's appointment, 
McClellan began to notice a change in his erstwhile 
supporter. Later, he was to date the start of his troubles 
from Stanton's taking office, claiming the new Secretary 
"did many things to break up the free and confidential 
intercourse that had heretofore existed between the 
President and m y s e l f . T h i s  statement is as much a
commentary on McClellan's grasp of the situation as it is on 
Stanton's activities. Nonetheless, Stanton was not without 
his use as a catspaw, as far as Lincoln was concerned. It 
would seem that the President put up with Stanton's 
machinations because he brought order to a chaotic War 
Department, could be useful in dealing with the Radicals, 
and was one man who could bear the consequences of costly 
decisions and unpopular actions. When friends remonstrated 
with the President over Stanton's propensity to pre-empt 
power, Lincoln observed that he might eventually have to
^George B. McClellan, "The Peninsular Campaign," in 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 2:163-64.
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"put bricks in [Stanton's] pockets," but in the meantime, 
the Secretary could safely be allowed to jump about.26
But the Radicals were not quiescent. There was an 
active public campaign against "bad" cabinet members and 
generals and continuing pressure to invade the South. As 
one Radical put it, "We want the army to kill somebody."27
In the absence of strategic confidences from his General-in- 
Chief, Lincoln succumbed. The President's General War Order 
No. 1 and Special War Order No. 1, mandated a general 
movement of all Union forces by 22 February and directed 
that, after first providing for the defense of Washington, 
the Army of the Potomac was to move toward Manassas 
Junction. These two orders seemed to undermine McClellan 
and raised the Radicals' hopes for deposing h i m . 28 The
immediate danger to McClellan was slight; Lincoln still 
expressed confidence in him and was only frustrated by the 
thought of, in essence, having his Army all dressed up with 
no place to go.29 Yet they were an indication of the limits
on the President's patience.
^Sandburg, War Years, 2:149-50.
27G.S. Ward to Fessenden, 23 January 1862, in Williams, 
Lincoln and the Radicals, 80-81.
2^Drozdowski, 716-18.
2^Orville H. Browning, The Diary of Orville Hickman 
Browning, eds. Theodore C. Pease & James G. Randall 
(Springfield, 111.: Illinois State Historical Library,
1925), 1:525.
Lincoln clearly favored direct movement and was equally 
forthright in his concern for the security of the capital. 
Yet in response to a query from the President regarding the 
relative merits of his and the General's plans, McClellan 
dismissed Washington as a base of operations, since from 
there it was too hard to attack the enemy at his presumed 
weak points. The Confederates were in a strong central 
position, and the weather had made roads in Northern 
Virginia impassable.
In contrast, using the Lower Chesapeake Bay as a base 
of operations would be better because it would force the 
Rebels to move from around Manassas to defend Richmond and 
Norfolk. The Rebel capital was a mere sixty miles west on a 
railroad line from West Point, with better terrain.
Moreover this plan would put the Army of the Potomac in the 
position of deciding the place and disposition of battle.
If there should be a defeat or setback, it would have a safe 
base in Fortress Monroe and the fleet. Further, a 
Peninsular attack would open up the Carolinas and Georgia, 
making it easier to reduce all southern ports, cut 
communications, and take the Mississippi River, breaking off 
Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas.^ This plan of attack would
^ L i n c o l n  to McClellan, 3 February 1862, in McClellan, 
Report, 97-98; McClellan to Stanton, 3 February 1862, Ibid., 
98-107.
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not endanger Washington, McClellan said, but he did not 
elaborate on how this should be so.31
To the General's mind, his plan made perfect sense—  
militarily. But he did not consider either the political or 
the psychological side of Lincoln's query. Washington must 
not only be safe, it must be seen to be safe. Lincoln was 
grappling with domestic pressure from all sides--Democrats 
to Radicals— as well as trying to prevent foreign powers 
from allying with or supporting the Confederacy. It was 
vital that the nation's capital be (or perhaps more 
important, seem) inviolable. If political considerations 
made him unreasonable about this issue, it behooved the 
General-in-Chief who was charged with the overall management 
of the war to reassure his President that proper precautions 
had been taken. But McClellan did not do this, and an 
important command link between the military and civil 
authorities was thereby broken.
Meanwhile, Bates noted the turmoil and discontent 
pervading Washington, and predicted that it was bound to 
shake up the administration. He attributed this to 
McClellan's inactivity.32
^McClellan to Stanton, 3 February 1862, in McClellan, 
Civil War Correspondence, 169.
32Bates diary entry, 3 February 1862, in Hendricks,
299. At the same time the Attorney General was uneasy about 
the CCW's delivering its report on General Stone and Ball's 
Bluff to Stanton. "I feared the establishment of precedent 
for congressional interference with the command of the army, 
which might lead to the terrible results seen in France, in
49
But there was movement in the West. victories at Forts 
Henry and Donelson in Tennessee raised northern morale and 
made Lincoln somewhat more inclined to indulge the General's 
campaign plan. They also created a climate of antagonism 
between McClellan and Stanton. Northern armies could move, 
and southern armies could be defeated. Why, then, was the 
Army of the Potomac stagnant? The antagonism erupted in the 
press, with the New York Herald leading the pack for 
McClellan and the Tribune (among others) backing Stanton. 3^
McClellan later charged that Stanton hereupon embarked 
on a deliberate campaign to sabotage the General's plans.34 
If this was the case, one opening salvo might have been a 
letter of 20 February that Stanton sent to the New York 
Tribune in which he pointedly jabbed at McClellan's much- 
touted success in organizing and training the Army of the 
Potomac. Progress in the war, the Secretary declared, was 
not due to "military combinations and organizing victory," 
but to "the Spirit of the Lord" which inspired and moved 
Union soldiers and rattled the Confederates. Stanton went 
on to blast the "stupendous and solemn folly in the Cabinet"
the days of the revolution," he wrote. 3 February 1862, 
Bates, Diary, 229.
•^Drozdowski, 643.
34McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 195.
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that supported such a belief in organization, which could 
not infuse confidence into the people.35
Another shot was the organization of the Army of the 
Potomac into corps d'armee. This issue was crucial in 
several ways. Generally, even military men agreed that in 
armies the size of those currently being fielded, there 
needed to be some sort of extra-divisional organization: it
was simply not feasible to break up command into so many 
pieces. But many of McClellan's senior generals— the ones 
likeliest to be made corps commanders— were also those most 
inclined to give him trouble: they were older than he and
often Republican (some political appointees), unlike the
A
younger, Democratic generals, most of whom owed their rank 
and position to McClellan himself. So McClellan had said 
over and over that he wished to make the determinations as 
to command after he led the army into the field and could 
evaluate the division commanders' leadership abilities.
■^John C. Ropes, "General McClellan's Plans for the 
Campaign of 1862, and the Alleged Interference of the 
Government with Them," paper read before the Military 
Historical Society of Massachusetts, 13 November 1876, in 
Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, The Peninsular 
Campaign of General McClellan in 1862: Papers Read before
the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts in 1876~T~
1877, 1878 and 1880 (Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 18 81),
1:19-21. Hereinafter referred to as MHSM 1.
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Radicals and Stanton pushed the reorganization precisely 
because the senior generals— all friendly to the Radical 
cause— would get the corps commands.^
Stanton also secretly embarked upon a campaign to 
induce the aging General Ethan Allen Hitchcock to replace 
McClellan. This was passing strange, considering the 
general was not only 63 years old, but in extreme ill- 
health. Hitchcock himself was appalled that Stanton would 
imagine him capable of field command, even though Stanton 
said that he and Lincoln were hard put to withstand the 
demands for McClellan's removal.37 Hitchcock refused
command but agreed to remain in Washington to advise the 
Secretary (and President).
On 20 February, Willie Lincoln, 11, died after a four- 
week bout with typhoid. The President's youngest son Tad 
was also very ill.38 The personal tragedy must have weighed
on Lincoln's mind, perhaps sapping him of the energy
3^Trefousse, Wade, 167-68.
3^15 March 1862, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Fifty Years in 
Camp and Field, Diary of Major-General Ethan Allen 
Hitchcock, U.S.A., ed. W.A. Croffut (New York & London:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, Knickerbocker Press, 1909), 438-39. 
Stanton had lured Hitchcock to the capital claiming that the 
President wanted the benefit of the General's experience; 
Hitchcock was reluctant— he was unfit for service, being 
bedridden even as Stanton made his appeal. The General 
concluded, "On the whole, I am uncomfortable, I am almost 
afraid that Secretary Stanton hardly knows what he wants, 
himself." Ibid., 439.
3®Browning, 1:530.
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necessary to press for clear answers from McClellan, fend 
off Radical demands, or curb his War Secretary.39
The situation was exacerbated at the end of February, 
when McClellan's attempt to retake Harpers Ferry and rebuild 
the railroad bridge there was foiled by the belated 
discovery that his transports were six inches too wide for 
the canal locks. He looked foolish, and the Radicals 
pressured Lincoln to rein in McClellan. 0^ Lincoln held his
counsel for the nonce. But events in March were to force 
his hand.
39Stanton complained that he was ready to move militarily, 
but he could only do so through the President, who was distraught 
over his sons' illness. 16 February 1862, Stanton to Chase, 
Papers of Salmon P. Chase, Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division.
^Drozdowski, 665-66.
CHAPTER FIVE 
DISTURBED SKY
Beware the ides of March I
I / ii
On 8 March, Lincoln called McClellan to his office to 
tell him that he was displeased with the outcome of the 
Harpers Ferry foray and that there was a rumor making the 
rounds to the effect that McClellan's plan to change his 
base of operations was a treasonous conspiracy to leave 
Washington defenseless.  ^ McClellan of course bridled at
such a suggestion and, in the words of one historian, 
decided on a flanking maneuver around the President's 
concerns about the Peninsula Campaign.2
He convened a meeting of his division commanders and 
General Randolph B. Marcy, his chief of staff and father-in-
^-McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 195-96 McClellan 
attributed Lincoln's aspersions on the Harpers Ferry 
situation to Stanton's malevolence. He claimed that the 
Secretary lied to him regarding Lincoln's understanding and 
acceptance of McClellan's explanation of those events and 
that this interview was, in effect, the fruit of Stanton's 
campaign to undermine his relationship with the Commander- 
in-Chief. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 195-96. 
Drozdowski, using Heintzelman's journal and Stanton papers 
lists this as 7 March. Drozdowski, 670-71.
2Drozdowski, 670-71.
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law. Marcy outlined both plans of advance, Urbana and 
Manassas. Erasmus D. Keyes, Andrew Porter, Fitz-John 
Porter, William B. Franklin, William F. Smith, Henry M. 
Naglee, George M. McCall, and Louis Blenker approved the 
Urbana plan; Heintzelman, McDowell, John G. Barnard, and 
Edwin V. Sumner opposed it.3
Lincoln was reluctant to face down the preference of 
McClellan and eight generals, but Stanton argued that the 
vote figures were skewed: each of the eight approving
generals owed his rank to McClellan. Only those independent 
of the Commanding General's patronage had voted the merits 
of the plan. Therefore he urged Lincoln to refuse 
authorization for the change of operational base/ But
Lincoln as a civilian did not want responsibility for a 
military failure if he overruled McClellan.^
That same day, the Confederate Navy sent the ironclad 
CSS Virginia into the Federal blockade fleet at Hampton 
Roads inflicting severe losses. This caused a great stir in 
Washington? even McClellan was upset. The fear was that the
^Gorham, 345-46.
^Gorham, 346-48.
^Drozdowski, 674-75. The last time he did this 
resulted in the defeat at Bull Run.
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Virginia1s seeming indestructibility would give it the power 
to attack with impunity whatever it pleased.6
Other events were moving to shape the General's plans. 
On the 8th also came word that Confederate General Joseph E. 
Johnston had withdrawn his troops from around Manassas and 
Centreville and pulled back behind the Rappahannock. Though 
he claimed the impassable roads made pursuit impossible, the 
next day McClellan decided to march his Army to the 
abandoned Confederate positions as a sort of shake-down 
sortie— a practice exercise preparatory to the real 
advance.7 What he found there caused a furor: at least
some of the Confederate defenses consisted of logs painted
fiDBrowning, 1:532. Stanton, in particular, was spooked. 
Welles left an especially rich account of his confrere's 
reaction. "The Merrimac, he said, would destroy every 
vessel in the service— could lay every city on the coast 
under contribution— could take Fortress Monroe— McClellan's
[mistaken] purpose to advance by the Peninsula must be 
abandoned. . . .Likely the first movement would be to come 
up the Potomac and disperse Congress, destroy the Capitol 
and public buildings, or she might go to New York and Boston 
and destroy those cities, or levy from them contributions 
sufficient to carry on the war." Welles replied that it was 
unlikely that the Confederate ironclad could be everywhere 
at once, and the newly-built Union ironclad Monitor would 
prove to be an adequate check. Stanton, however, was 
unimpressed when he learned that the Monitor had but two 
guns: "His mingled look of incredulity and contempt cannot
be described," Welles noted. Later that same day, Welles 
scuttled an attempt by Stanton to sink boats in the Potomac 
to halt the anticipated assault by the Virginia on 
Washington's public buildings. Undated entry, Welles,
Diary, 63-64, 66-67. Such a project would have obstructed 
the channel, which McClellan needed open and would in fact 
have bottled up Washington.
^McClellan, Report, 118-119.
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and propped up to resemble artillery pieces--"Quaker" guns. 
All along, McClellan had insisted that his opponents were 
numerous and well-armed and that he did not have enough men 
to attack them; this evidence seemed to refute his claims. 
Coming so soon after the debacle at Harpers Ferry, the 
discovery made McClellan look doubly incompetent.
While on maneuvers in Manassas, McClellan received the 
news— in the press— that Lincoln had relieved him as 
General-in-Chief.^ At the same time, the President created 
the Mountain Department west of the Alleghenies, under the 
command of Fremont, and the Department of the Mississippi 
under Halleek.^ All commanders of departments were
instructed to "report severally and directly" to Stanton.
War Order No. 2 directed that the Army of the Potomac was to 
make no change in base of operations "without leaving in, 
and about Washington, such a force as, in the opinion of the 
General-in-Chief, and the commanders of all the army corps,
^Paris, 122.
^President's General War Order No. 3. OR 5:54. The 
Fremont appointment was purely the result of Radical 
pressure. In the early part of the year, Fremont appeared 
before the CCW, and convinced them that the charges against 
him with respect to his Missouri command were groundless. 
Nevins, Fremont, 552-54. In March, Wade leaked the full 
text of the General's testimony to the press; and all over 
the North newspapers rallied behind him. The Senator 
believed there must be total war in order to break the slave 
power; McClellan was not going to provide this, and there 
must be extraordinary men for extraordinary times. To Wade 
and the other Radicals, Fremont was just the sort of general 
needed. Trefousse, Wade, 176-77.
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shall leave said city entirely secure.” Additional 
conditions included clearing the Confederate batteries on 
the Lower Potomac and commencing movement within ten days.^  
There was more.
This order also reorganized the Army of the Potomac 
into corps, assigning the new commands to the senior 
generals as a matter of course. McDowell took command of I 
Corps' four divisions, Sumner of II Corps, Heintzelman of 
III Corps, and Keyes of IV Corps— each with three divisions. 
These were to constitute the Army of the Potomac's field 
operations force. The troops assigned to the defense of 
Washington went to James S. Wadsworth, Military Governor of 
the District, and V Corps, operating on the upper Potomac, 
went to Nathaniel P. Banks.^ Both Banks and Wadsworth were
political appointees. McClellan particularly inveighed 
against Wadsworth's assignment to such a crucial and high- 
visibility command, which required a skilled military man—  
Franklin would be better. But Stanton sanguinely told him
■^President's General War Order No. 2, 8 March 18 62, 
Stanton Papers. Lincoln had discussed this with Stanton, 
Chase and Seward. Seward urged that the directive be issued 
in Stanton's name in order to strengthen public confidence 
in him. But Stanton demurred: considering his publicly
perceived vendetta against the General, it would seem as 
though personal animosity had sparked such instructions.
The President took responsibility for issuing the order. 11 
March 1862, Hay, 37-38. Drozdowski claims that not wanting 
to give Fremont the Mountain Department command was a factor 
in Stanton's reluctance to sign the order. Drozdowski, 695.
^-President's General War Order No. 2, Stanton Papers.
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that it must be Wadsworth because the Administration needed 
to "conciliate the agricultural interests of New York."12
Johnston's withdrawal behind the Rappahannock forced 
McClellan to move his proposed campaign to the York-James 
Peninsula (if he still wanted to flank the Confederates), 
using Fortress Monroe as his base of operations. This did 
not offer quite such glowing prospects for victory, but once 
the Navy had cleared the James River and reduced the 
Confederate batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester Point on 
the York, the Army of the Potomac's lines of communications 
would be entirely secure. It still presented the advantages, 
of a direct, unexpected route to the Confederate capital and 
better roads than Lincoln's proposed advance via Manassas.
On 13 March, McClellan convened a council of corps 
commanders at Fairfax Court House for the purpose of 
deciding what force should be left at Washington to meet the 
requirement of War Order No. 3. The commanders agreed 
unanimously on a Peninsula plan of operations, with the 
provisos that the Virginia be neutralized, there be adequate 
transport, and that "the force to be left to cover 
Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of 
security for its safety from menace." To Keyes,
12McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 226. Wadsworth, 
who had supported Lincoln over Seward in I860,-would become 
the (unsuccessful) Greeleyite anti-slavery Republican 
candidate for Governor of New York in the Fall of 1862.
Alden Hatch, The Wadsworths of the Genessee (New York: 
Coward-McCann^ Inc. , 1959) , 76-77, WT~.
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Heintzelman, and McDowell, this meant that "with the forts 
on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned and those 
on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the 
Virginia line of 25,000 men should suffice." Sumner felt 
this number should be 40,000.13 in the face of such
unanimity, Lincoln agreed to the plan, but repeated that 
McClellan must "leave such force at Manassas Junction as 
shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not 
reposess himself of that position and line of 
communication," and that, again, Washington must be safe.14
The Manassas requirement was an odd demand, "a measure - 
not dictated by any sound military consideration."^  And as
for Washington's security, McClellan felt that this (as well 
as the safety of the Manassas line) was an obvious benefit 
of his advance along the Peninsula. First, when Johnston 
pulled back behind the Rappahannock, he destroyed the 
railroad bridges necessary for any new advance on the
■^McDowell to Stanton, Report of Council of Corps 
Commanders, 13 March 1862, Stanton Papers. McClellan 
intended at this point to leave 66,552 men at Washington, 
Baltimore and the Shenandoah Valley; new arrivals would 
bring this number to 77,401? or 57,091 present for duty, 
less Dix's command at Fort Monroe, but with the convalescent 
hospitals to draw upon. This, of the total Army of the 
Potomac present for duty of 203,213, based on the 1 March 
return. An estimate of the Washington garrison (made 21 
October 1861 by Barnard and Barry) was 34,000. Thus from 
the beginning the General counted on 23,000 troops assigned 
to the Valley. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 163-64.
14Stanton to McClellan, 13 March, McClellan Papers.
^Swinton, 95.
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Manassas line. If he should somehow manage to recross the 
river, Union cavalry patrols would give sufficient warning 
to dispose troops to repel him. Second, immediately upon 
learning of the Army of the Potomac's movement up the 
Peninsula, Johnston would have to withdraw any remaining 
forces from Northern Virginia in order to meet the assault. 
Finally, "surrounded as Washington was with numerous and 
strong fortifications well garrisoned, it was manifest that 
the enemy could not afford to detach from his main army a 
force sufficient to assail them."^ Even war correspondent
Frederick Edge, who was willing to believe almost any 
scurrilous tale about McClellan, dismissed the idea of the 
Army occupying Johnston's old Manassas forts, for "the chain 
of batteries round Washington is ample to defend the city,
■^McClellan, Report, 142-43. As it happens, there was 
a serious proposal by a Confederate general to take 
advantage of the removal of the bulk of McClellan's troops 
to attack Washington. On 14 April, Confederate President 
Jefferson Davis met with his new War Secretary, Johnston, 
and Generals G. W. Smith, James Longstreet and Robert E.
Lee. Reporting on the Peninsula defense situation, Johnston 
said he felt the front would have to be abandoned. Smith 
recommended garrisoning Richmond and letting McClellan lay 
siege to the capital while the preponderance of Johnston's 
forces attacked Washington and Baltimore or Philadelphia and 
New York, with the cooperation of General Thomas J.
Jackson's Valley army. Longstreet also proposed holding 
McClellan before Yorktown while the main army marched on 
Washington via the Shenandoah Valley. Eventually, however, 
Davis decided to face the Federals on the Peninsula.
Douglas S. Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970) , 1:148-51.
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and it is scarcely likely that the enemy will return, having 
once quitted."I7
McClellan set about arranging for the defenses of 
Washington. On 16 March, his Adjutant General, Seth 
Williams, wrote Wadsworth about the number and disposition 
of the troops in the newly-created Military District of 
Washington (MDW). The geographical limits of MDW were the 
cities of Washington and Alexandria, the defense works south 
of the Potomac from Occoquan to Difficult Creek, and the 
post of Fort Washington. Banks was to command at Manassas 
Junction, but Wadsworth should nevertheless "exercise 
vigilance in your front, carefully guard the approaches in 
that quarter and maintain the duties of advanced guards," 
and also take care to protect flank approaches. All troops 
not necessary to police Washington and Georgetown or to 
garrison forts north of the Potomac should be moved south of 
the river. Wadsworth was instructed to post his main body 
of troops in the center of his front and to distribute 
"proper proportions at suitable distances" on either flank. 
He was to use patrols, urge troops to maintain the forts and 
arms and keep up training and discipline. He was also to 
look to the security of ferries, railroads and canals. And
17Edge, 18.
63
he was responsible for all new troops— forming them into 
provisional brigades, and training and equipping them.-^
The same day, McClellan ordered Banks to provide for 
the defense of Manassas. He was to entrench his force there 
and take positions at Centreville and Strasburg. He would 
repair railroad bridges and blockhouses between Washington 
and Strasburg, set out grand guards at Warrenton and in 
advance of his lines, and keep his cavalry well to the 
front. He was to develop good intelligence and cover the 
line of the Potomac and Washington.19 Banks had been in the
Shenandoah Valley to try to push out Confederate forces 
under Major General Thomas J. Jackson, but McClellan felt 
that the Valley was now secure enough that he could redeploy
Banks' corps in Manassas in order to allay the President's
20uneasiness.
Banks prepared to withdraw down the Valley toward 
Harpers Ferry to comply with his new orders. But on 23 
March, as McClellan began embarking troops for Fort Monroe, 
Jackson attacked a Onion force under James Shields at 
Kernstown. Though repulsed tactically, Jackson achieved a 
strategic victory, in that his assault forced Banks to
■^Williams to Wadsworth, 16 March 1862. Papers of 
Abraham Lincoln, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
-*-9McClel lan to Banks, 16 March 1862. McClellan, Civil 
War Correspondence, 212.
20Webb, 89-90.
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cancel plans to evacuate the Valley. McClellan's "Manassas" 
force would now remain along the Shenandoah.
At the time, Kernstown seemed a fortunate opportunity 
to capture Jackson or drive him permanently from the Valley, 
securing the B & 0 Railroad and communications into Eastern 
Tennessee, where Lincoln was anxious to render support to 
the pocket of loyalists who resided there. It was also a 
second chance for Fremont to make his military mark.
As commander of the Mountain Department, Fremont was 
responsible for guarding the B & 0 and seizing the railroad 
between Richmond and Knoxvil le.2-*- Stanton had opposed
Fremont's appointment, seconded by Hitchcock, who described 
Fremont as "the willing idol of a party whose design is to 
pervert the constitutional power of the government to 
revolutionary purposes."22 The Radicals wanted Fremont to 
make the kill in the Valley. The CCW conferred with 
Stanton, urging him to detach Louis Blenker's division from 
the Army of the Potomac and send it to the Mountain
^Thomas to Fremont, 22 March 1862, OR 7, pt. 3:8.
2223 March 1862, Hitchcock, 440-41. The hostility of 
the War Secretary became so well known that Horace Greeley 
urged the President to intervene. The issue, he said, was 
not whether or not Fremont was a great general, but that 
"our loyal people, with scarcely an exception, are anxious 
that he should be permitted to show what he is." If Lincoln 
did not give Fremont full latitude, "it will generally be 
thought that he has been crippled, and the government will 
be blamed for whatever ill [?] fortune [?] may befall- Pray 
look to this." Greeley to Lincoln, 16 March, 1862, in 
Lincoln, 5:169n.
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Department. Although antipathetic to Fremont, Stanton was 
willing to aid the Radicals, but with McClellan supported 
enthusiastically by the Democrats, Lincoln did not relish 
the consequences of depriving him of Blenker.23 There were
also rumors that the Radicals were using Lincoln to get 
McClellan. Bates warned the President that "extreme men in 
Congress were lying in wait against him," especially 
regarding McClellan.24
Hitchcock suggested that Lincoln send Fremont only  ^
enough troops to protect the B & 0, using others to 
reinforce McClellan's right, which was open to attack by the- 
Confederates "who, though not likely to take it, might be 
invited by its weakness to make some desperate attempt 
similar to one already made by Jackson upon Shields."2^
However, the Radicals were implacable: Fremont must be
reinforced. Stanton was eager to accommodate the ultras. 
Based, he noted, on McClellan's own figures, he recommended 
sending 19,500 troops to Fremont (8,500 under Blenker, 9,000 
under Hooker, plus three cavalry regiments, four batteries 
of artillery and two pontoon trains). That would leave 
McClellan the force already at Fort Monroe, 80,000;
22Trefousse, Radicals, 192, 196.
2415 March 1862, Bates, 240-41.
^Hitchcock to Lincoln, 30 March 1862, OR 12, pt. 
1:229-30. Hitchcock did not specify the location of "the 
right", but probably was referring to Manassas.
McDowell's corps, 34,000; Richardson's Division, 8,000; and
5,500 cavalry volunteers— for a total of 127,500. There 
would remain at Washington 3,300 regular cavalry, 4,200 
regular infantry, 12,000 volunteer infantry, 110 guns, and 
two pontoon trains. He listed about 8,000 troops in the 
Baltimore-Annapolis area, which could presumably be called 
u p o n . 26 with everything so clearly provided for, he
concluded, Hooker and Blenker could easily be spared.
Lincoln, perhaps heeding Greeley's advice, finally 
agreed to send Blenker only, and informed McClellan of the 
detachment, assuring him that this division would be the 
last troops taken from the Peninsula operation. The 
President told McClellan, "If you could know the full 
pressure of the case," he would understand; McClellan later 
insisted that this pressure "was only a political one to 
swell Fremont's command."27 <phe General remonstrated with
the President and Secretary, but the best he could negotiate 
was Stanton's authorization to redeploy Blenker in the
2^Stanton to Lincoln, 30 March 1862, Stanton Papers. 
Stanton calculated 80,750 as already having arrived at Fort 
Monroe, with 67,000 yet to be transported (including the 
troops of Blenker and Hooker that he wanted transferred to 
Fremont). He counted Banks as part of the force left in 
Washington, although this may be based on the assumption 
that Banks would shortly be at Manassas instead of in the 
Valley. He appears to have entirely disregarded Sumner's 
Corps in his summary.
^ L i n c o l n  to McClellan, 31 March 1862, Lincoln, 5:175- 
76; McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 165.
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Valley with Banks, as long as he was in a position to 
reinforce Fremont. 8^
Meanwhile, the defense network south of the Potomac was 
inspected, with the following report: Fort Barnard had
eight guns; armament, ammunition, parapets slopes, and 
abatis were fine. Fort Richardson had nine guns; one mortar 
was unserviceable and one magazine leaked. Arms, 
ammunition, parapets, and abatis were in good condition.
Fort Albany, with twelve guns, had thin parapets, but arms 
and ammunition were acceptable. Forts Craig and 
Tillinghurst had seven guns each, all in good order. These - 
five fortresses were occupied by the 14th Massachusetts 
Volunteers. The troops were not yet fully drilled. Fort 
Cass's five guns, arms, ammunition and physical plant were 
all in good condition. It was garrisoned by a fully trained 
company (seventy-four men) of the Wisconsin Heavy Artillery. 
Fort Woodbury had five guns. Its slopes were caving in, and 
one magazine was flooded; everything else was fine. It was 
not garrisoned,^ however; only one sergeant and two sentinels 
were stationed there. Fort Dekalb likewise had nine guns, 
but no garrison; an ordnance sergeant and two sentinels were 
in residence. Its slopes were washing away, but arms, 
ammunition, and abatis were in good condition. Whatever 
troops garrisoned these two forts would require training.
28stanton to McClellan, 31 March 1862, OR, 5:62.
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An artillery officer should coordinate it all, the 
inspectors recommended; and they concluded that the works 
were in good condition, considering the season.
McClellan notified Banks— clearly still believing V 
Corps would soon take up positions around Manassas— that the 
Confederates had retreated across the Rappahannock, 
destroying the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station.
There was no trace of the enemy north of the river, and they 
had deserted Fredricksburg. He predicted that Johnston 
would not reinforce Jackson for any offensive in the Valley; 
the scene of action would soon shift to the Peninsula.30
With this, finally glad to be away from the sink of 
iniquity that he had found Washington to be, McClellan on 1 
April embarked at Alexandria for Fort Monroe. In an effort 
to assure the President that Washington was indeed "entirely 
secure", one of his final acts before departing was to 
outline his provisions for the capital's defense; Dix had 
6,800 at Baltimore, Annapolis and the Eastern Shore; Fort 
Delaware was "very well garrisoned" with 400 men.
Washington forts were manned by 10,600, with "other 
disposable troops" under Wadsworth's command amounting to 
11,400. There were 3,359 railroad guards in Maryland, who
2%.B. Sweitzer to Colonel D.B. Sackett, Inspector 
General, 29 March 1862, OR 12, pt. 3:29-30.
•^McClellan to Banks, 1 April 1862, in McClellan, Civil 
War Correspondence, 220.
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should be relieved by dismounted cavalry and sent to 
Manassas (since they were "old regiments" and therefore fit 
for critical assignments). He also requested that some
3,500 troops being raised in Pennsylvania and any others 
from New York and other eastern states be sent to Manassas, 
along with 4,000 from Wadsworth's command. Warrenton's 
force totaled 7,780, with 12 pieces of artillery. If all 
this were done, there would be 18,639 men under 
Abercrombie's command at and around Manassas.
Blenker was to be moved from Warrenton to Strasburg 
(from the Rappahannock line to the Valley), remaining there 
"long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in 
that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination" 
(the Mountain Department). Thus, troops in the Shenandoah 
Valley would amount to 35,467 men (Blenker's 10,028 men and 
24 artillery pieces, V Corps's 19,687 men and forty-one 
guns, 3,652 disposable cavalry, and 2,100 railroad guards). 
Hooker, on the Lower Potomac, was to be relieved by a 
regiment of 850 men, who would join 500 cavalry to be left 
there.
Thus, the General concluded, he had deployed the 
following numbers for the defense of the capital, with 
18,000 left "for the garrisons and the front of Washington":
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At Warrenton:
At Manassas:
In Shenandoah Valley: 
On Lower Potomac:
7,780
10,859
35,467
1,350
Total: 55,45631
This, he said, was entirely sufficient for the 
protection of the city, even if Blenker's division was 
subtracted, especially since the threat of Confederate 
attack was minimal: Johnston was behind the Rappahannock
with no means of advance. Moreover, the city's defensive 
works were in good condition, manned by disciplined troops. 
And, most importantly, the Army of the Potomac's operations 
on the Peninsula would pull the remainder of the Rebel army 
even farther away from the capital. "Surrounded as 
Washington was with numerous and strong fortifications well 
garrisoned, it was manifest that the enemy could not afford 
to detach from his main army a force sufficient to assail 
them."32
-^McClellan to Thomas, 1 April 1862, OR, 11, pt. 3:59-
60.
32McClellan, Report, 142-3.
CHAPTER SIX 
BURY CAESAR
People, and senators, be not affrighted;
Fly not; stand still: ambition's debt is paid.
Ill, i
Stanton's next action was passing strange, in light of 
the fact that he had already accepted McClellan's figures as 
comforting enough to justify sending 19,000 of the General's 
men to Fremont: scarcely had the General left the docks
than the Secretary he demanded a report from Wadsworth on 
the state of the city's defense forces.-*- Wadsworth reported
that he had under his command 15,335 infantry, 4,294 
artillery and 848 cavalry (of which only six companies were 
mounted), for a total of 20,477. Less sick and those in 
arrest and confinement, there were but 19,022 men in 
Washington and Alexandria. Further, they were "new and 
imperfectly disciplined" troops, and there was no mounted 
light artillery. Moreover, from this force he was ordered 
to send away 4,000 men to Manassas, and four additional
^Stanton's motives must be suspect in issuing this 
order, since the Inspector General had only days before 
received a report on the fortifications, made in the course 
of the Army's preparations for departure. See pp. 67-68.
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regiments to various other commands. In short, "looking at 
the numerical strength and character of the force under my 
command, it is in my judgment entirely inadequate to and 
unfit for the important duty to which it is assigned."2
Immediately Stanton pounced on Hitchcock and Adjutant 
General Lorenzo Thomas, ordering them to investigate whether 
McClellan had complied with the President's orders of 13 
March to "leave Washington entirely s e c u r e . T h e  two 
generals noted McClellan's figures (55,456 total) and 
Wadsworth's (19,022 "imperfectly disciplined" men), factored 
into the equation the corps commanders' 13 March definition- 
of a sufficient covering force (which Hitchcock and Thomas 
put at 25,000, with 30,000 to fully garrison the forts on 
the right bank of the Potomac), and concluded that McClellan 
had indeed not obeyed the President's order to protect the 
capital.4 Hitchcock later testified that when he and Thomas
^Wadsworth to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Stanton Papers. 
Later, before the CCW, Wadsworth testified that at this time 
he had only five regiments with any artillery training or 
experience. The left bank of the Potomac was stronger than 
the right, but he would have to strip the city's forts to 
garrison the ones south of the river. He estimated that he 
needed 25,000 "first class" troops for Washington's defense. 
When the Confederates at Gordonville and Culpeper left, he 
conceded that he would need fewer troops. Wadsworth 
consistently maintained that there was no Union army between 
the Confederates and Washington. JCCW 1:252-3.
•^Stanton to Thomas and Hitchcock, 2 April 1862, OR, 11, 
pt. 3:57.
^Thomas and Hitchcock to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Stanton 
Papers. They noted that McClellan had included Banks' corps 
in his figures, but declined to express an opinion as to 
whether Valley troops should rightly be considered part of a
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deducted Banks and Blenker, they could not find "25,000 men 
as a unit of force" for the forts at Washington and on the 
two banks of the Potomac, concluding, "If there was need of 
a military force for the safety of the city of Washington 
within its own limits that referred to in the report of 
General Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate."5 
Although their investigation had taken less than a day, they 
were convinced that the capital was in danger. When this 
was reported to Lincoln (as fast as Stanton could manage), 
"he was manifestly under great anxiety."6 The President
thereupon instructed the War Secretary to hold back one 
corps from McClellan— either McDowell's or Sumner's— for the 
protection of the city.^
Stanton ordered McDowell detached and informed 
McClellan that this had been done because the President 
deemed the defenses of Washington inadequate.® McDowell
deployed his troops around Manassas, Warrenton, and 
Centreville.  ^ On 5 April, I and V Corps were detached
defense force for Washington.
^Thomas and Hitchcock to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Ibid.
^Hitchcock's testimony before McDowell inquiry, 16 
January 1863, OR, 12, pt. 1:220.
^Lincoln to Stanton, 3 April 1862, Stanton Papers.
®Thomas to McClellan, 4 April 1862, OR 12, pt. 3:66.
^McDowell to Colonel Edmond Schriver (Chief of Staff),
3 April 1862, Ibid., 39-40.
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completely from the Army of the Potomac and made respec­
tively the Armies of the Rappahannock and Shenandoah.10
Stanton directed McDowell that Washington was "especially 
under your protection" and that he was not to move his 
troops out of position for the defense of the city.1!
Meanwhile, Major General John E. Wool's command at Fort 
Monroe was removed from McClellan's control, reducing his 
force by another 10,000.12 Thus, at a time when unified
military coordination was vital, McClellan was relieved of 
command of not only other forces but also of all Virginia 
armies except the three corps he had with him. Now there 
were four commanders in the theatre between the Alleghenies 
and the Atlantic. Banks, Fremont, and McDowell, as well as 
various independent commands, received orders from Lincoln 
and other civilians, Thomas or Hitchcock.^ McClellan was
quick to note that the creation of these two new departments 
deprived him of control of his supply depots at Washington, 
his base of operations at Point Comfort and command of the
l^Thomas to McClellan, 5 April 1862. McClellan Papers. 
-^ ■^ Stanton to McDowell, 11 April 18 62, OR 12, pt. 3:66. 
■^Thomas to McClellan, 3 April 1862, McClellan, Report,
156.
13Charles A. Whittier, "Comments on the Peninsular 
Campaign of General McClellan," paper read before the 
Military Historical Society of Massachussets, 13 November 
1876, in MHSM 1:233-34. Whittier observes that Halleck was 
unsuited by nature and habits to coordinate the sort of 
effort necessary, and Thomas and Hitchcock were simply 
without talent.
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theatre. He also took it to mean that he was relieved of 
responsibility for the defense of Washington, but he 
nonetheless protested vehemently against the disruption of 
his command and his campaign.14 Since making his plans for
the Peninsula campaign, he had lost 50,000 men; he now would 
have only 85,000 when all arrived. At least, he begged, 
send I Corps to take Gloucester and enable rapid movement to 
West Point.^
Lincoln responded by citing the numbers Wadsworth had 
given him, remonstrating that " . . .  less than twenty 
thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, 
were all you designed to be left for the defense of 
Washington and Manassas Junction," part of which was to be 
moved to the Lower Potomac. It would have been adequate, 
Lincoln said, if Banks were at Manassas, but McClellan 
disturbed that plan without substituting any other force for 
that area, leaving the line from Richmond to Washington 
"entirely open, except [for] what resistance could be 
presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops." 
With Banks in the Shenandoah Valley instead of at Manassas, 
the Confederates would be tempted "to turn back from the 
Rappahannock and sack Washington." Therefore, McClellan had
-^McClellan to Lincoln, 6 April 1862, Lincoln Papers; 
McClellan, "The Peninsular Campaign," in Battles and 
Leaders, 2:170.
l^McClellan to Stanton, 7 April 1862, McClellan, Civil 
War Correspondence, 232.
7 6
patently neglected the President's repeated orders to leave 
Washington secure, and Lincoln had acted appropriately by 
withholding McDowell.
Another blow to the campaign was General Order No. 33, 
which closed recruiting depots for volunteers and halted all 
recruitment.^ There would be no new troops to sustain the 
Army of the Potomac on its campaign.
There was also the loss of the Navy. McClellan had 
emphasized to Stanton the "absolute necessity" of swift 
movement to West Point, whence he expected to take Richmond. 
The batteries at Yorktown would have to be dealt with, 
either besieging the town or through a combined operation 
against it with a strong flanking corps under cover of the 
Navy. A siege would slow down the entire campaign;
-^Lincoln to McClellan, 7 April 1862, Lincoln Papers. 
The President warned McClellan that he was making political 
enemies with his attempts to reorganize his army to the 
benefit of his favorite subordinates. Lincoln himself has 
had to suffer political slanders; McClellan must learn to do 
the same.
-^McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 151. McClellan 
took this as a personal attack on himself, but barely two 
weeks before Wadsworth had reported that so many troops had 
arrived in Washington that he believed "the force now here 
amply sufficient for the protection of the capital." He 
begged that the Secretary send him no more troops, at least 
until he could arrange for sanitation requirements. 
Wadsworth to Stanton, 21 March 1862, OR 12, pt. 3:7.
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therefore he needed both McDowell's corps (which was to 
perform the flanking maneuver) and the Navy.18
Toward that end, McClellan and his subordinates had 
negotiated with Assistant Navy Secretary Gustavus V. Fox for 
support in the action.^ on 17 March, McDowell informed his
chief that Fox "promises all the power of the Department 
shall be at our disposal" and said that Louis M.
Goldsborough, Flag Officer commanding the blockade force in 
the Lower Chesapeake, would be conferring with one of his 
subordinates.20 But three days later, McDowell reported
that "the ability of the Navy to do their part" was now in 
question.21
Concerning Yorktown, Fox later insisted that "the Navy 
Department never was consulted at all, to my knowledge, in 
regard to any thing connected with the matter." Goldsbor-
l8McClellan to Stanton, 19 March 1862, OR 5:57-58. The 
Secretary responded that Lincoln would talk with the General 
on this issue. Stanton to McClellan, 19 March 1862, Ibid.,
11, pt. 3:18. There appears to be no evidence, however,
that such a conference ever took place.
l^Reed blames these attempts to get naval cooperation
for the delay in implementing the Peninsula campaign, and
for McClellan's reliance on I Corps' amphibious capability."
Reed, 130.
^McDowell to McClellan, 17 March 1862, OR 11, pt. 3:9.
Lt.-Col. Daniel P. Woodbury of the engineers included in his
report on the Peninsular conditions a statement that
Goldsborough "expressed his desire to co-operate in every 
way." Woodbury to McClellan, 19 March 1862, Ibid., 22-24.
^McDowell to McClellan, 20 March 1862 , Ibid., 24-25.
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ough had been directed to cooperate as much as possible, he 
conceded, but no plan was ever submitted to the Navy from 
the War Department for such a combined operation? in fact, 
it was not practicable for his gunships to attack the 
Yorktown batteries, which were placed too high. Moreover, 
he concluded, "no complaint was ever made to the Navy 
Department" regarding the situation.22
It seems clear that McClellan, with his penchant for 
seeing things as he wanted them to be, was simply making the 
assumption that, because he wanted the Navy to reduce the
22John C. Palfrey, "The Siege of Yorktown," paper read 
before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts 14 
January 1878, in MHSM 1:43-44. Reed posits that there was a 
conspiracy directed against McClellan, claiming that there 
are only two documents extant of a correspondence "reflec­
ting the abundant negotiations on the subject" of Navy co­
operation in the Peninsula Campaign (one of 14 March 1862 
from Welles to Stanton, denying McClellan's request for a 
squadron at Port Royal; and one of 24 March from Fox to 
Goldsborough leaving it up to the latter if or how to co­
operate with McClellan)— all the rest were removed to pro­
tect the guilty. Reed, 126. This seems a bit farfetched, 
particularly in light of the fact that no one (Reed in­
cluded) has ever accused the Navy of being actively anti- 
McClellan. Even as she suggests a plot, Reed notes that 
there is nothing in OR, or the papers of Fox, Welles or 
McCellan, to indicate that direct support of the Yorktown 
assault was ever promised. It is hard to credit McClellan 
with destroying or concealing any real or imagined evidence 
that he was wronged in this matter. And finally, given 
Welles's and Stanton's mutual antipathy, it is unlikely that 
the Navy Secretary would engage in such shenanigans in a 
cause that would play into the War Secretary's hands.
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Yorktown and Gloucester Point batteries, the Navy would do 
so. 23 The loss of McDowell is perhaps more serious.
McClellan believed he had left sufficient troops in 
Northern Virginia adequately to defend Washington. Stanton 
had apparently felt that the city was so secure that 19,000 
troops could be sent to Fremont. And even Hitchcock had 
given tacit approval when McClellan sent him figures on the 
arrangements for the city's defense, as he declined to offer 
any suggestions, since McClellan was more familiar with the 
situation.24
This, of course, was before Jackson nipped Banks's 
heels at Kernstown. McClellan had to delay the transfer of 
V Corps to Manassas in hopes of stopping Jackson. And 
Lincoln himself believed this was an splendid opportunity to 
clear the Confederates from the Valley— he continually 
pressed Banks, Fremont, and (eventually) McDowell to catch 
Jackson in some sort of pincer maneuver. But as time went 
on, and Jackson remained at liberty, things seem to have 
altered: the longer he escaped capture or defeat, the more
menacing he appeared.
23McClellan knew before leaving Washington that naval 
support in the reduction of the Yorktown batteries was 
unlikely, as evidenced by his instructions to General 
William F. Barry, his Chief of Artillery, to come equipped 
for besieging the town's works. McClellan to Barry, 22 
March 1862, McClellan Papers.
24OR, 5:63.
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In making provision for the defense of Washington, 
McClellan did not believe it was necessary to occupy 
Manassas in force. The enemy had retreated across the 
Rappahannock, destroying the only bridge that enabled him to 
recross. Hitchcock and Thomas agreed: "In regard to 
occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the 
railroads leading to it it may be fair to assume that they 
have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their 
late position, and therefore no very large force would be 
necessary to hold that position."25 Even Wadsworth thought
it "very improbable that the enemy will assail us at this 
point."25 yet this is where McDowell situated his corps-
cum-army, without comment from Lincoln, Stanton or the 
Washington generals. Stanton in fact soon had intelligence 
confirming that the Confederates had left the Rappahannock 
for Yorktown; but he made no changes in McDowell's 
disposition.
McClellan also had counted Banks's corps in the 
Shenandoah Valley as a substantial and legitimate part of 
the defense of Washington. Here there was controversy.
25Thomas and Hitchcock to Stanton, 2 April 1862, OR 11, 
pt. 3:61.
26\r?adsworth to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Stanton Papers. 
The MDW commander qualified this statement by noting "this 
belief is based upon the hope that they [the enemy] may be 
promptly engaged elsewhere, and may not learn the number and 
character of the force left here." Ibid.
27stanton to Banks, 13 April 1862, OR 11, pt. 3:94.
81
McDowell stated that the 13 March council of corps 
commanders did not think Valley troops should be included in 
the capital defense forces, and McDowell himself did not 
consider Valley troops "properly applicable" to the city's 
d e f e n s e . 28 Hitchcock believed that the troops at Warrenton 
and Manassas were a legitimate part of the defense of 
Washington; but the Valley was really a separate front, and 
therefore Banks should not have been included because he was 
actually needed in that theatre. Moreover, since Blenker 
was removed from the Army of the Potomac, he should not have 
been counted among the defense forces at all.29
McClellan of course saw it differently. Again and 
again, he insisted that he left plenty of high quality 
troops well-placed for the city's defense, but 
administration actions kept back 134,000 men, leaving him 
but 85,000 to carry on a campaign that required from 110,000 
to 140,000, "according to circumstances."^
^ M c D o w e l l  testimony at McDowell Inquiry, 12 December 
1862, OR 12, pt. 1:104.
^Hitchcock before McDowell inquiry, 16 January 1863, 
OR, 12, pt. 1:220. Hitchcock felt, at the time, that 
Blenker ought not to have been sent to Fremont. He said so 
to Stanton, who agreed and sent the General to Lincoln to 
argue the case— unsuccessfully.
^McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, 241? McClellan to 
Stanton, 3 February 1862, Gorham, 376-77. In refuting 
McClellan's claims to have only 85,000 troops with him, 
Gorham goes on to point out that, according to McClellan's 
own statements, by 5 April, Assistant Secretary of War John 
Tucker reported having transported 121,500 men to Fort 
Monroe. Ibid.
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Regarding the withholding of I Corps, on 3 April,
McDowell discussed it with one of his division commanders, 
who reported to McClellan.
McDowell told me that it was intended as a blow at 
you. That Stanton had said that you intended to 
work by strategy and not by fighting? that all of 
the opponents of the policy of the administration 
centred around you— in other words, that you had 
political aspirations.31
McDowell urged Stanton not to withhold troops from McClellan 
because if the General did have political ambitions, this 
blow would only serve them; Stanton was unmoved.^
This rift between Stanton and McClellan became a public
issue, as Democratic newspapers proclaimed that a Radical
plot to destroy McClellan's political chances was
endangering the Army of the Potomac.
The radicals have gained, by some means or other, 
a very dangerous influence over the War 
Department, and an end cannot be put [to] it a
moment too soon. . . . They want to have the war
prolonged. . . . They know the [speedy] 
restoration of the Union would be the death knell 
of their faction. . . ."33
Stanton was warned that there was "much feeling" 
regarding his "depriving" McClellan of I Corps, but he
^Franklin to McClellan, 7 April 1862, in McClellan, 
McClellan's Own Story, 151.
^william B. Franklin, "The First Great Crime of the 
War," in The Annals of the War Written by Leading 
Participants North and South, ed. Alexander K. McClure 
(Philadelphia: Times Publishing Co., 1879), 81.
^James G. Bennett, signed editorial in New York 
Herald, 4 April 1862, in Drozdowski, 789.
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remained steadfast.34 in fact, he was even then consulting 
with Chase and Admiral John A. Dalgren to combine Fremont's 
and Banks's forces under McDowell and send them south to 
take Richmond while McClellan wallowed on the Peninsula. At 
a military council on 9 April, the President rejected that 
plan because he knew Fremont would never serve under 
MeDowel1.35
Thus in a few days had McClellan's brilliant campaign
plan been destroyed. To his mind the withholding of I Corps
was the shattering blow.
It frustrated all my plans for impending 
operations. It fell when I was too deeply 
committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of 
continuing operations that had been begun. It 
compelled the adoption of another, a different, 
and a less effective plan of campaign. It made 
rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was
a fatal error.35
3^C.C. Fulton to Stanton, 9 April 1862, Stanton Papers. 
This correspondent laid the blame on machinations by 
McDowell, concluding that "if we should be defeated through 
trickery of McDowell, a terrible retribution will rest 
somewhere."
3^Drozdowski, 7 60.
36McClellan, Report, 553.
CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUCH SLIPPERY GROUND
How many ages hence 
Shall this our lofty scene be acted over 
In states unborn and accents yet unknown!
Ill, i
McClellan never wavered from his claim that the loss of 
I Corps sounded the death knell for the Peninsula campaign 
and that its detachment had no military basis. Stanton 
conspired with the Radicals to undermine all his plans to 
ensure his defeat and all talk of the security of the 
capital was merely a smokescreen for the plot to ruin the 
victory that rightly belonged to him and his Army.
The General believed that he had indeed left Washington 
safe from attack. Throughout the Peninsula campaign, he 
insisted, Northern Virginia was "completely in our 
possession, and the vicinity of Washington free from the 
presence of the enemy." The capital, he said, was never 
threatened until the Confederates learned of the Army of the 
Potomac's evacuation from the Peninsula.1 Therefore, the
McClellan, Report, 124. As it happens, the 
Confederate army in Virginia was indeed concentrated on the 
Peninsula (except, of course for Jackson in the Valley).
But at the same time, McClellan always contended that 
Johnston evacuated Manassas and Centreville only upon
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withholding of I Corps was not— could not--be predicated on 
military considerations; it had to be a political decision, 
made with the specific intent of ruining McClellan.
This is certainly the way the Democratic press saw the 
case. Moreover, there is evidence that Stanton was doing 
his best to undermine the General: offering command of the
Army of the Potomac to Hitchcock, pushing for reinforcements 
for Fremont, maneuvering for the corps reorganization, even 
scandalmongering.2
Stanton's duplicity notwithstanding, the character of 
the times must be taken into consideration when examining 
decisions that were made regarding the conduct of the war. 
Rabid as McClellan's supporters in the press were, there was 
equal fervor on the Radical side. Those who believed in the 
conspiracy of the Slave Power considered McClellan and his
learning of the Union plans for an advance along the 
Peninsula.
20n 2 April, Senator Orville H. Browning met with 
Stanton and Lincoln. The Secretary repeated a rumor that 
McClellan had been inducted by Jefferson Davis into the 
Knights of the Golden Circle only two years previously.
Word was that Davis was McClellan's mentor and still had 
power and influence over the Union General. Therefore, 
McClellan would never really try to defeat the South.
Stanton added that "he didn't believe these imputations of 
disloyalty, but they were believed extensively and did us 
injury," Browning noted. Stanton pursued Browning, 
insisting that McClellan was not in earnest, and should have 
been removed long since. He urged Browning to propose to 
the President the promotion of one Colonel N.B. Buford to 
Major General and command of the Army of the Potomac—  
Stanton would second the nomination. Even McDowell was 
better than McClellan, Stanton concluded. 2 April 1862, 
Browning, 1:538-39.
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ilk the personification of that evil which was sapping the 
vigor of the Union cause. Jane Grey Swisshelm, a Minnesota 
abolitionist, exemplifies this viewpoint. McClellan, she 
wrote, purposely sent Baker to Ball's Bluff "to be disposed 
of" and took the Army of the Potomac to the Peninsula's 
swamps "to be decimated by disease and by placing detached 
corps on positions to be attacked by overwhelming numbers of 
the enemy." In fact, not to put too fine a point upon it, 
McClellan was allied with Satan.3
The Radicals despised and feared McClellan as much for 
his West Point background as his Democratic political 
leanings. They continually pressured Lincoln to remove 
McClellan and replace him with a general with political bona 
fides. They were afraid that the war would be settled 
without a southern defeat and the destruction of slavery, 
that it would end before they had firmly grasped the reins 
of power.4 Yet their choice— Fremont— was not having much 
success, either. The Pathfinder could not seem to locate a 
road to Jackson that would decisively end the Valley 
campaign, and his demands for reinforcements matched
311 April 1863, Jane G. Swisshelm, Crusader and 
Feminist: Letters of Jane Grey Swisshelm, 1858-1865, ed.
Arthur J. Larsen (St. Paul, Minn.: Minnesota Historical
Society, 1934; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press,
Inc., 1976), 213-216. This date is not in error: long 
after McClellan had been removed from command (and before he 
became a presidential candidate), the Radicals continued to 
fulminate against him.
4Wil liams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 10-26 passim.
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McClellan's throughout the spring of 1862. Eventually, he 
would resign his appointment rather than serve under John 
Pope (yet another Radical torchbearer).
Without question, Jackson played a significant role in 
this drama. His actions in the Shenandoah Valley upset 
McClellan's plans for the defense of Washington and caused 
Lincoln mounting anxiety. Although early on Banks knew that 
the Confederate forces were quite small,5 the fact that
three different armies could not stop Jackson from going 
where he would must have driven the President crazy. He 
withheld first Blenker in hopes of Fremont ridding the 
Valley of Jackson, and then McDowell to reinforce the 
capital's security. The city would not be safe while 
Jackson was free. By late May, Lincoln was himself devising 
strategy and tactics, trying to coordinate Banks, McDowell 
and Fremont into springing a trap on Jackson. And it was 
his choice to withhold a corps from McClellan's field force 
to protect Washington.
This decision was based on a rather astonishing paper 
chase: McClellan insisted that he left more than 70,000
troops for the defense of the city; Wadsworth et al. 
answered that there were only 19,000. This is a serious 
discrepancy, yet historians do not seem to have explored it. 
They accept the figures of either one side or the other and
5Banks to Thomas, 6 April 1862, OR 12, pt. 3:48-50.
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go on from there. There are several curious mysteries 
involved in these numeric differences that had such serious 
consequences, curiosities that lend support to the idea that 
the withholding of McDowell's corps was not based in 
military necessity.
For one thing, there was a rather indecent haste 
attached to the "investigations" by Wadsworth, Thomas and 
Hitchcock: both reports were made 2 April, presumably
within hours of Stanton's queries, and, significantly, the 
day after McClellan departed for Old Point Comfort--while he 
was incommunicado.6 it seems unlikely indeed that this
triumvirate had access to any relevant documents unavailable 
to McClellan, and they certainly could not have uncovered 
any such new figures in the brief time they devoted to their 
inquiries.
Further, in all the documents relating to the numbers 
of troops defending Washington, Wadsworth, Thomas and 
Hitchcock only mentioned forces in the city itself (the
19,000 men). The latter two did go so far as to note that 
Manassas was probably a moot point and sniffed that the 
value of forces in the Shenandoah Valley was not really 
their concern.7 Yet the council of corps commanders had
considered a covering force integral to the city's defense
6OR, 11, pt. 3:57-62.
7Ibid., 61.
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network, and in McClellan's summary the Military District of 
Washington was only part of that system (of 70,000 men). 
Wadsworth's figures for the troops under his command were 
not so very different from McClellan's, but the Commanding 
General emphasized a "covering force", which Stanton's 
triumvirate seems to have ignored completely.^
Checking the monthly troop returns to discover what 
exactly the situation was does not help much to resolve the 
discrepancy. They were in fact not officially compiled and 
submitted until four months later.9 There is no indication
that they were ultimately "fixed," but they are not 
necessarily indisputable evidence of what McClellan and his 
opponents saw and relied upon in those crucial days in
^Another oddity is the fact that McClellan never 
pursued this question. What he did do was remonstrate with 
both Lincoln and Stanton about the detachment of I Corps—  
but only from the viewpoint of his campaign plans being 
ruined. He never addressed the issue of his provisions for 
Washington's security, leading to speculation that he was 
not ready to live and die by the accuracy of his numbers.
9See Appendix. The return from which these figures 
were drawn was for the entire Army of the Potomac. Monthly 
returns for individual units (up to the divisonal level), 
which might help get at the actual counts, are not filed in 
the same manner as those for armies. They are apparently 
kept amongst the daily troop musters, which are stored 
higgledy-piggledy in mismarked cartons in the National 
Archives, unsorted and seemingly undisturbed since their 
dumping there sometime in the last century. Trying to find 
the relevant documents and make sense of them would be 
heartbreaking work, if not an impossibility.
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April.10 The return's figures for the Military District of 
Washington (19,920 enlisted present for duty? 22,410 
aggregate present and absent) support McClellan's 1 April 
count? plus another 1,459 in the Military District of 
Alexandria (part of Wadsworth's command as of 17 March). 
Wadsworth's total of 20,477, with 19,022 present for duty is 
certainly close.H But he did not mention any of the other
troops included in McClellan's 1 April disposition, nor 
listed in the March return for the Army of the Potomac. He 
did not specify whether he had included troops from the MDA, 
but it seems unlikely. Nor did he apparently mention the 
unattached units (on the March return amounting to some
8,000 troops), which were left in and about the capital and 
later transferred to the MDW command. He likewise excluded 
the 13,430 men (as on March's return) under Major General 
John A. Dix in Maryland (6,988 by McClellan's 1 April 
estimate). And he disregarded the 3,317 railway guards 
(3,359 in McClellan's), which McClellan wanted moved forward 
to Manassas— albeit with 4,000 of Wadsworth's troops.
Interestingly, the March return's total for the troops 
available for the defense of Washington, Maryland, the 
Valley and Northern Virginia was in excess of 91,000, more
10The official returns do reflect minor discrepancies 
from the figures published as extracts in the OR. But these 
differences are tiny indeed.
■^Wadsworth to Stanton, 2 April 1862, Stanton Papers.
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even than McClellan's figures, which his detractors claimed 
were outrageously inflated, if not downright fabrications. 
Subtracting Blenker, Banks, and Dix, there were still nearly
32,000 troops in and immediately around Washington--and 
designed to be left there for its protection.^2
It is true that Banks had not been able to take up 
position around Manassas, and Lincoln had made his concern 
for security there abundantly plain. But his force was 
serving its proper function by countering the threat in the 
Valley. If V Corps had been at Manassas, covering the 
Rappahannock, it would be expected to parry any attempt by 
Jackson to menace Washington. As it was, he was keeping the 
Confederates occupied a good distance from the capital.
McClellan counted these troops in the Shenandoah Valley 
as a legitimate part of the capital's defense network. 
Thomas's and Hitchcock's refusal to comment on the utility 
of Valley forces was an indication that they disagreed. V 
Corps was among the many units that went unmentioned in 
Wadsworth's report. And Lincoln clearly believed that if 
the men in the Shenandoah should be counted at all, they 
must be considered secondary to those at Manassas and
12These figures, of course, represent the aggregate 
present and absent (everyone who was on the rolls as 
assigned to a unit). Present for duty figures would be 
smaller by about ten to twenty percent.
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Warrenton. This point has been debated by military men
and historians— with no resolution. But, again, Banks was 
doing at least as good a job in the Valley as he could have 
around Manassas (given his inate ineptitude), so it would 
seem that McClellan was correct.
And if the retention of I Corps was for solely military 
reasons— for the defense of Washington and the destruction 
of Jackson— its disposition around Manassas was an odd de­
ployment. The defensive works around Washington were in 
good order and were manned two years later with far fewer 
troops than were left in the city in the spring of 1862.14
By all accounts, there was a consensus that this was the 
least likely approach for any Confederate attack— there was 
no means for the enemy to cross the river in force. All the
l^Lincoln to McClellan, 7 April 1862, Lincoln Papers. 
Justifying the retention of I Corps, the President stated 
that McClellan's provisions for the safety of Washington 
would have been adequate with Banks at Manassas, but when 
McClellan "disturbed" that deployment (keeping V Corps in 
the Valley, and not putting a comparable force along the 
Virginia line), he had endangered the capital. Clearly, 
Banks at Manassas meant security; Banks in the Valley meant 
peril. The Department of the Shenandoah had been detached 
from McClellan's command as of 3 April. Lincoln himself 
could have moved Banks to Manassas instead of withholding 
McDowell, had he really deemed this the best disposition for 
the security of Washington.
•^Although it must be noted that in 18 64 Lincoln had 
more confidence in General Ulysses S. Grant's strategy and 
his ability to cover Washington. Moreover, by then, it was 
clear that the European powers were not going to support the 
Confederacy, so there was not as much riding on any attack 
on the capital. Confederate General Jubal A. Early's July 
near miss was more in the way of counting coup than a 
strategic threat to the city.
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action was then taking place in the Valley and soon on the 
Peninsula. Yet McDowell was parked at Manassas and told 
that his special charge was the protection of Washington, 
and he would "make no movement throwing your force out of 
position for the discharge of this primary duty."15 Then he 
was given orders to advance by land to join with McClellan 
north of Richmond; then to work with Banks and Fremont to 
catch Jackson.16 In the end, his corps was exhausted by the
marches across Northern Virginia, Jackson slipped through 
the three Yankee armies, and McClellan was deprived of his 
flanking column. Nearly 40,000 troops were, in effect, 
completely wasted.
McClellan spent a great deal of time remonstrating with 
Stanton and the President over the loss of I Corps. He 
complained that this action was to blame for the failure of 
the Peninsular Campaign, from beginning (the need to lay 
siege to Yorktown instead of flanking it) to end (dividing 
his Army across the Chickahominy River, leaving it to be 
attacked p i e c e m e a l ) . - ^  These charges have been debated for
^Stanton to McDowell, 15 April 18 62, OR 12 pt. 3:66.
^Stanton to McDowell, 17 May 1862, Ibid., 11, 1:28? 
Stanton to McDowell, 24 May 1862, Ibid., 12, 1:28; Lincoln 
to McDowell, 24 May 1862, Lincoln, 5:232-3.
•^His claim that sending I Corps overland caused him to 
extend his own men across the Chickahominy in May does not 
hold up well: as soon as the James River was cleared by the 
destruction of the Virginia and the Norfolk Navy Yard—  
before McDowell's order to advance— McClellan made no moye 
to change his base of operation to the James River; and in 
fact never mentioned this possibility until long after the
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more than 128 years, and it seems pointless to throw more 
wood on that fire.
The issue here is whether the decision to withhold I 
Corps was made for purely military reasons. That would 
appear to be out of the question. McClellan had left a 
force for the defense of the Washington area that should 
have been adequate. Banks was doing his job (more or less), 
the defense works around the city were in good condition, 
and there were no Confederates to speak of north of the 
Rappahannock or east of the Blue Ridge. Retaining 
McDowell's entire corps and deploying it around Manassas 
seems both excessive and redundant.
It is true that McClellan had not complied with 
presidential orders: while his provisions for the defense
of Washington may have been adequate, they did not meet the 
specifications laid down by his 13 March council of corps 
commanders.1® This left him open to Stanton's very 
carefully worded charge: "[R]eport to me whether the
campaign had ended. Both options (moving to the James or 
staying with the original West Point plan) are noted in 
McClellan's Own Story, 342-43. But three pages later, he 
lays blame for the loss of the entire campaign on McDowell's 
orders to join him overland. Ibid., 346. Yet, he later 
testified that he would have been entirely glad to have 
McDowell's corps no matter how it arrived. McClellan before 
McDowell inquiry, 10 December 1862, OR 12, pt. 1:95.
■^I.e., the covering force (excluding the Federals in 
the Valley, which were clearly of no account to the 
triumvirate) did not amount to the 25,000 to 40,000 men 
recommended.
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President’s order and instructions have been complied with 
in respect to the forces to be left for the defense of 
Washington and its security and at Manassas."19
If this action was not taken for military reasons, 
then, what could be the motivation? These would have to be 
both psychological and political. There was a climate of 
anxiety in Washington, which had been perceived as being in 
danger to greater or lesser degrees since the Secession 
Winter of 1860—61. An attack on the city— successful or 
not— could tip the international scales in favor of the 
Confederacy. The Radicals had their own ideological agenda,, 
which they believed took priority over purely military 
objectives. And McClellan scorned to inform his civilian 
superiors even as he declined to consult his subordinates. 
Lincoln was trying to balance all these opposing interests 
while still maintaining a government. He made mistakes.
One element in those errors was his loss of confidence 
in McClellan, for which the General has himself largely to 
blame. Lincoln's concerns for the security of the city—  
regardless of their basis in military reality— were made 
clear repeatedly in presidential inquiries and orders. 
McClellan in his arrogance ignored them, refusing to explain 
his actions or plans to the President, and he paid the 
consequences. If I Corps was withheld for non-military
19Stanton to Thomas and Hitchcock, 2 April 1862, OR 11, 
pt. 3:57.
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reasons— to reinforce the sense of security (if not the 
actual safety) for the Federal capital— this is not to say 
that psychological considerations are invalid when making 
military decisions.
Another factor, of course, was politics. Republicans 
were taking over the reins of power, with all the turmoil 
that accompanies a change of government. That this was 
going on during a civil war exacerbated the viciousness of 
that process. In particular there was the fanatical 
antagonism displayed by the Radicals, in which Stanton 
clearly took active part. If not forming an actual cabal, 
these men certainly found it to their mutual advantage to 
work together to undermine McClellan: the Jacobins to
restructure the prosecution of the war along their 
ideological lines and Stanton to gather the reins of power. 
Wade and his ilk had laid the groundwork by pushing for 
Fremont's new command and reinforcements and for the 
reorganization of the Army of the Potomac. But it was the 
War Secretary who waited until McClellan was out of the city 
and away from a telegraph to instigate the reports of 
Wadsworth et al., who played on Lincoln's fears, and who 
directed the deployment of McDowell. There would be no West 
Point/Democratic Caesar to triumph if Stanton and the 
Radicals had any say in the matter. If they had to risk a 
short-term loss on the Peninsula in order to entrench their
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individual and collective power, well, that was the price to 
be paid.
Thus the General was undermined: stripped of supreme
command, refused naval support, removed from control of his 
supply depots, cut of from new recruits, and, finally, 
denied his flanking corps. His ordeal, unlike Caesar's, 
would be dragged out for six months before he would 
ultimately be removed from command of his beloved Army. But 
the fatal blow, he was always convinced, was the withholding 
of McDowell's corps. For him, it was the "most unkindest 
cut of all."
APPENDIX
TROOPS AVAILABLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON1
Unit Location Number
Blenker Division
Banks Corps
Military District 
of Washington2
Military District 
of Alexandria-^
Dix's Division^
Railway Brigade^
Warrenton Junction 10,584 
Woodstock 32,625
Washington
Alexandria
Maryland
Washington
22,410
1,459
13,430
3,317
Abstracted from Return for March, 18 62, of Army of the 
Potomac. Signed by George B. McClellan, Major General, 
Commanding, 4 August 1862, Harrison's Landing, Virginia. 
National Archives, RG 94, Returns of the Army of the Potomac 
and the Army of the Rappahannock.
^Command instituted 15 March 18 62, per General Order 
No. 25, War Department.
^Command instituted 17 March 1862, per Special Order 
No. 83, Army of the Potomac.
^Transferred to Middle Department, 22 March 1862.
^Transferred to Middle Department, 22 March, 1862.
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Unattached Units
Volunteer Artillery®
Fort Washington^
Field Works &
Artillery
Co. B, 26th Penn. 
Volunteers®
Field Works &
Artillery9
Washington
North of Potomac
Washington
South of Potomac
134
198
4,371
93
1,511
TOTAL: 90,132
^Transferred to Military District of Washington 
^Transferred to Military District of Washington 
®Transferred to J.S. Wadsworth, etc. 
^Transferred to J.S. Wadsworth, etc.
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